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STUDIES IN BOUNDARY THEORY*:
THREE ESSAYS IN ADJUDICATION AND POLITICS**
AL KATZ***
INTRODUCTION
A full explication of Boundary Theory must await another oc-
casion, but a brief outline of its key concepts is set forth here
in order to place the following essays in perspective.
Boundary Theory seeks to unpack certain fundamental char-
acteristics of the form of human experience. It is, because it must
be, at once a method and a theory of consciousness. As a method,
Boundary Theory asserts that if one approaches a problem with
the attitude that the problem is or was a solution to some (other)
problem, it becomes possible to understand the nature of that solu-
tion by asking whether it struck a middle course between alterna-
tives, or whether it saw the situation as inevitably binary, or
whether it transcended the alternatives in a novel synthesis. Bound-
ary Theory asserts that the number of available choices is thereby
exhausted. This approach opens up the dynamics of genesis and
historical change; the preferences or blind spots of a person or a
period; the staying power of a theory and its weaknesses.
As a theory of consciousness, Boundary Theory asserts that
human thought is contained within a finite number of forms. These
forms are fundamental and should not be understood as necessarily
confining human intelligence. Boundary Theory seeks to show that
* Along with Six Essays on Crime and Criminal Law (unpublished 1978), one of
-which has been published in somewhat different form as Katz and Teitelbaum, PINS
Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, in A. GOUGH & L. TErrELBAUM,
BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 201-34 (1977), reprinted in 53
IND. L.J. 1 (1977), the three essays published here complete the individual Studies in
Boundary Theory.
** Though he would no doubt take exception to much of what is said herein, this
paper is dedicated to the memory of David Louisell.
*** Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. I am indebted to
Bob Gordon for over five years of vigorous skepticism and stingy enthusiasm. My associa-
tion with Kennedy has been shorter and episodic but no less intense. I have relied on
these two friends to flag gross mistakes of fact and theory; remaining errors in these
classes may be attributed to their failure to take care that my reputation as a scholar be
not further damaged. I will take my own lumps on mistakes of doctrine. I am also grateful
to Konefsky, Lindgren, and Schlegel for reading countless fragments and for keeping me
from taking my peculiar perception of the world too seriously.
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human reason works with a small, basic set of perceptual-intel-
lectual categories: unity, duality, mediation. This basic set is highly
elaborated by two additional categories: the relation of wholes and
parts, and transcendence. The combinations and permutations of
these five categories are entirely a function of the existence of two
types of boundaries: Vacuum Boundaries and Live Boundaries.
"Vacuum Boundary" describes a distinction between two opposed
phenomena where there is no third term, no compromise, no
mediation. A Vacuum Boundary is a line. "Live Boundary" de-
scribes a distinction between two opposed phenomena separated
by a "space" that partakes of both but is neither: compromise,
mediation, ambiguity.
Boundary Theory is genetically related to the foundations of
human experience. Human birth is simultaneously a moment of
separation and symbiotic unity that, in addition, inaugurates a
history of social connection. Without more, this development
places Boundary Theory at the heart of human experience: the
understanding of difference that constitutes one version of in-
dividual identity; the understanding of similarity or connection that
constitutes another version of identity. While Boundary Theory
does not rest on a naive biologism, it does assert that under all
cultural circumstances the primal human experience is constituted
by consciousness of similarity and difference. For example, even
Piaget's cognitive-developmental theory holds that the primary
forms of understanding are object conversation (unity), classifica-
tion (similarity), and seriation (difference).' Similarity and dif-
ference, in the form of the experience of connectedness and
disconnectedness, are at the root of all social relations, and there-
fore all social theories. Thus the social theory of capitalism em-
phasizes individual identity as a dynamic of differences; the social
theory of socialism emphasizes individual identity as a dynamic of
similarities.
The essay that follows is intended as an application of Bound-
ary Theory to three concrete problems of adjudication and politics.
The essay is a "test" of the theory in the same sense as any other
test of a theory; no assertion is (or can be) made that the examples
prove the theory, or that other approaches could not produce more
satisfactory understanding.
The studies contained in this essay take up three classic legal
1. J. PIAGET, GENETIC EPISTEMOLOcY (1970).
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problems from the perspective of Boundary Theory. Each may be
identified by reference to an equally classic legal decision: Ex parte
Young;2 Harris v. Balk;3 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.4 The first
study tries to understand the relation between the eleventh and
fourteenth amendments; the second deals with the relation be-
tween in rem and in personam jurisdiction; the final study attempts
a perspective on the relation of substance to procedure. Each of
these problems is constituted by a binary situation that is eventu-
ally elaborated by the creation of a middle space that purports
to resolve a perceived dilemma. The initial duality is Vacuum
Bounded in that it asserts a relation of difference. The middle term
that comes to be inserted within the original duality reconstitutes
the situation as a Live Boundary. The essays in their present form
attempt to show that in these contexts the transformation from
Vacuum to Live Boundary is a strategy for avoiding choice on mat-
ters of fundamental political significance. In doing so a choice was,
of course, made-and I shall try to say something about the nature
and significance of that choice.
Two cautionary notes: First, a good deal of the material in
this essay is the subject of an existing scholarly debate. While
I am persuaded that my version is sound, the general usefulness of
Boundary Theory is not necessarily destroyed by my errors of ap-
plication. Second, this essay is not the easiest to read. One reason
for the difficulty is that I assume the reader has a certain familiarity
with background ideas and language. I do not fully recapitulate
arguments available elsewhere. The result is a degree of density
uncommon in legal literature. For this I apologize and offer the
hope that the prose can be simplified when the whole work is com-
pleted. But a generation of scholars that appears able to pass over
phrases like "pareto optimal" without blushing should have no
difficulty with the phrase "civil society," for example.
2. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
3. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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I. "STATE ACTION" AND ACTIONS AGAINST THE "STATE"
In this essay I will consider the relationship between the elev-
enth amendment bar to federal jurisdiction over suits against the
several states, and fourteenth amendment substantive constraints
on state action. The eleventh amendment erects an absolute barrier
to the vindication of claims against the states; the fourteenth
amendment establishes substantive restraints on actions that can
be attributed to the states as political corporations. When may the
actions of a person be attributed to the state? In what mode may
interests harmed by such actions be vindicated? Legal doctrines of
attribution and vindication thus specify the concrete relationship
between state action and actions against the states. Behind this
specific legal duality of attribution and vindication, however, are
more abstract ideas of politics and social order that help shape legal
doctrine. This paper relates two sets of ideas about politics and
social order to legal doctrines of attribution and vindication. The
first of these is the relationship of the continuity of the social order
to modes of political representation; the second is the somewhat
less abstract and more institutional question of the relationship of
responsibility for official action to the exercise of legitimate power
to provide a remedy.
I shall discuss these three sets of ideas and doctrines in the
following way. I will begin by briefly recounting a line of Ameri-
can political thought from the revolutionary period to the end of
the 18th century. I will try to understand this line of thought as
an effort to work through specific problems of continuity and repre-
sentation. I shall show how this effort led to the emergence of two
"theories" of representation in the Federal Constitution. I shall
call one the theory of agency and the other the theory of the corpo-
rate-state. The two theories of representation-the former held
largely by federalists, the latter by antifederalists-embodied and
generated different views of the responsibility of political agents
and the legitimacy of judicial intervention. The two theories of
representation and the different views of responsibility and legiti-
macy shed light on the crisis of Chisholm v. Georgia; and the prob-
lematic language of the eleventh amendment. I will argue that one
reason the eleventh amendment was written in terms of judicial
5. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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legitimacy was that the problem of responsibility could not be
solved because there remained in the Federal Constitution two
quite distinct ideas about representation.
Once the crisis around Chisholm is understood in this way,
it becomes clear that while the eleventh amendment was a victory
for antifederalists, it was also a victory for the essentially federalist
theory of agency representation. The evidence for this proposition
will be the concrete legal doctrines of attribution and vindication
which, for the first seventy-five years of the 19th century, engen-
dered no legal doctrine of "state action" in the sense of a doctrine
establishing corporate responsibility for official harm-producing
behavior. During this period both the attribution of responsibility
and the mode of vindication were personal; state action entered,
if at all, as the exculpatory defense of legal authority.
Against this background it will be possible to appreciate more
fully the legal problems generated by the fourteenth amendment's
articulation of rights specifically against the states as corporate
bodies. I shall try to understand these legal problems along three
dimensions. First, though the 19th century had developed a legal
doctrine of attribution and vindication that reflected acceptance
of an agency theory of representation, the fourteenth amendment
postulated the legal responsibility of the corporate-state. This as-
sertion of corporate-state legal responsibility meant that existing
legal doctrine attributing responsibility to state agents personally
was no longer coherent. Second, postulating corporate-state re-
sponsibility also meant accepting, at some level of consciousness,
an important conceptual truth: that the corporate-state was capable
of acting against the people as an "autonomous" corporation and
not as their representative. This conceptual truth created a vacuum
within representation: who represented the people when the state
acted against them as an autonomous corporation? Third, the pos-
sibility of autonomous corporate action, in reviving the general
issue of representation, necessarily revived the problem of judicial
legitimacy: federal judicial intervention to impose corporate-state
responsibility was specifically precluded by the eleventh amend-
ment.
My major point will be that all three dimensions of this crisis
were avoided at the level of legal doctrine primarily by splitting
the attribution of (state) responsibility from the modes of (per-
sonal) vindication, and secondarily by accepting into constitutional
law the notion of apparent agency authority. The contradictions
1979)
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within the two theories of representation and the dilemma of re-
sponsibility and legitimacy were thus mediated by a legal doctrine
that could have it both ways in all cases save one: legal actions that
demanded money damages from the corporate-state. Analysis in
the terms suggested thus leads to an increased appreciation of the
significance of these cases. I will conclude by suggesting several
general implications for politics and law.
A. Representation and Civil Society
Revolutionary America rejected English social organization
and its theory of representation. In liberal English thought, society
consisted of the Crown, the aristocracy, and the common people.
When these three estates were present in the "mixed" government
of Parliament, the entire body politic was present by "virtual"
representation. Revolutionary American republicanism, however,
rejected hierarchial social organization and held to a belief in the
inherent virtue of civil society and its unity of interest in the com-
mon good. Given this belief in the preexisting virtue of civil so-
ciety, its constitution in a broad sense was not perceived as the
basic problem. Rather, the essential task was to develop a form of
government that would confirm and protect republicanism. Given
republicanism, the English form of "virtual" representation would
not do.6
Republicanism appeared most consistent with "actual" repre-
sentation. That is, if furthering the common welfare was the end
of government, it followed that government should be directly re-
sponsible to the people. But early efforts to develop a system of
actual representation ran into serious theoretical and practical dif-
ficulties. In theory, if civil society were really united in interest,
only one representative was necessary. In practice, local communi-
ties (counties or towns) sent actual representatives to a legislative
body that tended to split into factions rather than exemplify a
unity of interest in the common good. Unity of interest, if it existed
at all, appeared to be confined to local communities, and this sug-
6. On Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary ideology and politics, I rely heavily on
B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MONfENT 506-52 (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). For accounts of earlier organicist theories, see E. KANroxo-
wicz, THE KING'S Two BODIES (1957); L. LOEMKER, STRUGGLE FOR SYNTHESIS: THE SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURY BACKGROUND OF LEIBNITz'S SYNTHESIS OF ORDER AND FREEDOM (1972); M.
WALTZER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTS 171-183 (1965). On the theory of political virtue,
see J. LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 108-10 (Laslett ed. 1960).
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gested, according to republican ideology, that local communities
constituted the communitas of civil society. Consequently, there
was no theoretical basis precluding the secession of local com-
munities from post-Revolutionary state organization; the con-
tinuity of the latter was endangered.
So long as belief in the preexisting unity and virtue of civil
society held firm, there was no way to ensure the binding effect of
majoritarian legislation and the continuity of the states as com-
munities. But abandoning belief in the preexisting unity and virtue
of civil society meant that the people had to be seen as in a state
of nature. That is, there had to be, prior to a political contract be-
tween rulers and ruled, a social contract that would assure the
continuity of civil society and provide a basis for political society.
The notion of a social contract established the binding effect of
majoritarian legislation and secured the supremacy of the social
contract over that legislation. These two principles were the major
contribution of the period to future developments, though neither
was accepted at the time without considerable confusion and
doubt.
For a significant number of the social and intellectual elite,
the state constitutions were a theoretical and practical disaster.
They tended to produce "factional" legislation that bore none of
the marks of virtue as that notion was understood.7 Furthermore,
egalitarian republican ideology allowed new "elements" in society
to be raised to positions of power, and the elite saw this power be-
ing used to further self-interest and to indulge a "lust for luxury"
rather than to promote the common good." Finally, private rights
and private power-understood at the time as the virtues of social
distinction and property-were threatened by a legislative su-
premacy that did not respect virtue but spoke in the name of
public power and public right. The ideology of equality, when
realized in politics, confronted the class structure of civil society.
7. The' post-Revolutionary period spawned sharply divided political parties in the
teeth of this hostility to "faction." Professor Buel explains the apparent paradox as a
consequence of the insecurity of ruling elites in the 1790's, and of relative degrees of
confidence in the stability (continuity) of republicanism. R. BUEL, SECURING THE REVOLU-
TION (1972). I relate this crisis of authority to criminal law doctrine in my essay, Innocence
and Guilt (unpublished 1978).
8. The shift in fashion from buckles to shoestrings and slippers put 20,000 British
citizens out of work at the end of the 18th century. Madison took this opportunity to
praise the "manly sentiments of American citizens . . . who are occupied in supplying
wants, which being founded in solid utility," ensured subsistence and a "dignified sense
of social rights." 6 WRITINGs OF JAMES MADISON 100 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
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In the immediate post-Revolutionary period, then, the states
solved the problem of representation with a social contract and
majoritarian politics. In doing so, however, it was necessary to
abandon belief in the unity of interest and the domination of virtue
in civil society; but without unity and virtue, moral continuity be-
came a problem.
B. Continuity and Political Society
The federalist thought informing the creation of the Constitu-
tion turned revolutionary republicanism on its head. In revolu-
tionary republicanism the moral notion of the preexisting unity
and virtue of civil society was a postulate of the general good.
Federalism, however, insisted that political power should reflect
the particular virtues of social distinction and property so that
political virtue might create general social virtue. The older belief
in the inherent good of civil society was replaced by a belief that
civil society must be made good 9 by a political society drawn more
fully from the "better classes."'1 The revolutionary republican
belief in social equality was replaced by the federalist doctrine of
political equality concretized in "universal" suffrage." Finally,
9. Compare Professor White's statement of
the ultimate ambiguity of the American Revolutionary mind: its failure to come
to a single conclusion on the role of government with regard to man's natural
rights. Was it merely to guard them, to see to it that they were not invaded? Or
was it to abet and favor the people in attaining certain God-proposed ends?
M. WnrrE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION 256 (1978). White argues that
in the drafting of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson was himself caught up in
this theoretical struggle, and hypothesizes that "the victory went to the Jefferson who
thought that government should merely see to it that man did not enjoy less happiness
than he could enjoy in what James Wilson called 'an independent and unconnected state
of nature.'" Id. at 255. This is the ambiguity of resp.onsibility that I shall argue is re-
peatedly transformed into an issue of legitimacy. See text accompanying notes 117-21 infra
for a brief discussion of the "substantive due process" crisis of the 1930's in these terms. For
a recent statement of Jefferson's final position as stated in the Declaration, but freed of
ambiguity and history, see Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal
Law, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 871, 885 (1976).
10. But see J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 82-120 (1973) for the view that the
absence of this belief in the American Revolution distinguishes it from the French Revo-
lution. But the crisis of the post-Revolutionary period was that the people did not dif-
ferentiate themselves in such a way as to yield up a natural aristocracy. See G. WooD,
supra note 6, at 391425.
The bearing of Locke's epistemology of self-evident principles on the right to rule is
discussed in M. Wnra, supra note 9; the argument is summarized in id. at 48-52.
11. Suffrage was, of course, limited to property holders. The rationale for this in the
thought of Hamilton and Adams can be traced directly to Blackstone (see M. Wum,
supra note 9, at 258-67) whose "defect of will" theory (1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMMNTaRIES
*170-71) may, in turn, be traced to 17th century English Revolutionary principles. See
C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POssESSIVE INDIVIDUALIsM 107-59 (1962). I dis.
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federal power would insure moral continuity by protecting mi-
nority (property) interests from the excesses of state majorities.
Federalist thought took the social assumption of revolutionary re-
publicanism-the unity of interest in civil society-and realized it
by negation in the construction of political society: unity of in-
terest would be restored by a governing elite that universalized its
particular interests.12
The political doctrine of sovereignty was the specific tech-
nique used to solve the problem of moral continuity generated by
the state's solution to the problem or representation; federalism
located sovereignty in the national population. That is, where the
preexisting unity of civil society had once provided moral con-
tinuity, the political notion of sovereignty would now serve. But
national popular sovereignty as a solution to the problem of moral
continuity raised new problems of representation for the federal
union. 3
cuss the significance of will in relation to the development of criminal law in Innocence
and Guilt, supra note 7. On Blackstone, see Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. Rav. 205 (1979) Part III B (3) (a).
12. The Republicans believed the measures of government should fit the expecta-
tions of the governed [public opinion], because they had faith in republics. The
Federalists believed rather that the social order was artificial, that contrivance
was necessary to its preservation, and that the decisions of an elite must never
take second place to the prejudice of the people.
R. BUEL, supra note 7, at 91-92. "Federalists talked both as if virtue was to be restored,
and as if it had vanished and must be replaced by new paradigms." J. PococK, supra
note 6, at 520. See Yarbrough, Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the
Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic, 41 REV. OF POLiTics 61 (1979),
arguing that the framers "sought to 'combine the advantages of liberal freedom and re-
publican virtue, without the disadvantages of either." Id. at 63.
13. See J. PococK, supra note 6, at 519:
The Country tradition in English politics-partially descended from Harring-
ton's republicanism, in which rotation ensures that the people take part in govern-
ment as individuals and by turns, rather than through representatives-had made
an important contribution toward redefining England as a Commonwealth when
it stressed the importance of short parliaments. The implication was that the
people, being propertied and independent, were by definition virtuous, but that
their representatives were constantly exposed to the temptations of power and
corruption; it was therefore necessary that the representation should return regu-
larly to the represented, to have virtue renewed (ridurre ai principii) by the
choice of new representatives if necessary. Virtue was an active principle, and in
the election of a new parliament the people displayed virtue in action and per-
formed more than a Hobbesian role. But it now became hard to decide whether
the electors were one estate or order of the commonwealth (a classical Many)
and the elected another (a classical Few), the relations between whom must be
preserved from corruption; or whether the elected were at bottom mere servants,
stewards, or ministers, who must be presumed corruptible virtually by definition.
If the latter, then they must be considered delegates, subject to instruction and
recall; but there would be the difficulty that the relation between them and their
electors would no longer be a virtuous relation between civic equals. During the
19791
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C. Agency and Corporate-State
Two plausible "theories" of representation might be drawn
from the Constitution. I shall call one the agency theory; the other
the corporate-state theory.
The agency theory may be developed along the following
lines. Under the federalist notion of popular national sovereignty,
the rulers became the ruled, but the power of the people as rulers
was limited to suffrage. Put another way, the role of the people in
government was extended in theory and limited in practice. Given
the limitation, further assurance was needed that the people would
not soon lose their control. This assurance was provided by giving
the old notion of separation of powers new meaning and central
significance. In federalist thought, the separation of powers would
not only serve the negative function of limiting power by fragment-
ing it, but the fragmented parts would-out of self-interest 4-con-
trol the other parts. Since political power was to be self-controlling
and could accommodate an indefinite range of particular interests,
the limited role of the people in government presented no special
problem. Finally, the distribution of powers was to be stated in the
Constitution itself.
In outline this is the constitutional theory of agency. The people
years of the American crisis, Burke was propounding to the electors of Bristol the
view that their representative was chosen by them to act for the good of the whole
realm, and thus to play a part which they could not play themselves. He there-
fore owed them the exercise of his judgment concerning the common good, even
when it conflicted with theirs. They would be exercising their judgment with
equal propriety if they decided not to reelect him at the close of his term, but
they should not seek to impede his judgment by instructing or recalling him.
The first major national crisis of representation after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion was the ratification of the Jay Treaty. Federalists took the position that the view of
the majority was unknown, and that in any case the wisdom and virtue of the elected
Senate and President should prevail over the poorly informed passions of the moment.
Republicans thought that the rulers should be ruled by the (sovereign) people. See R.
Bum, supra note 7, at 105-12.
14. See TnE FEDmA.sr Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison). See also 6 WRITINGs OF JAMES
MADISON 91-93, supra note 8, where Madison plainly states that Federalism and the separa-
tion of powers are together a necessary middle position between the dual evils of schism
(anarchy) and consolidation (monarchy). This essay was published five years after the
Federalist Papers and one year after he openly broke with Hamilton on the issue of the
Bank.
Madison's views on federalism and the separation of powers, as expressed in the
Federalist Papers, are tied to prevalent late 18th century views that held that individual
human motivation is irrational and self-interested, but may produce a general good when
properly organized. See A. LovEjoy, The Theory of Human Nature in the American
Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise (Lecture 11), in REFLEMCONS ON HUMAN
NATuRE 35-65 (1961). An interesting general discussion may be found in A. ISCIMAN,
THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTs 20-31 (1977).
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elect agents all of whom represent the people. The form of this
representation is specified in the Constitution, and direct enforce-
ment of the specification is entrusted to agents. The Constitution
stands between the people and their agents: agents derive their
authority from it, and that authority is to be effectively circum-
scribed by other agents who also draw their authority from the
Constitution. An agent represents the people only so long as he acts
within constitutionally specified authority.
The corporate-state theory may be developed as follows. The
political society established by the Constitution did not organically
"crepresent" civil society in the way the "mixed" government of
Parliament "represented" the three estates. The absence of an
organic connection marks the separation of political and civil
society. The Constitution vests all political power in the govern-
ment for the purpose of administering for the general good. Popu-
lar sovereignty is largely a fiction since the people have no legal or
effective political power beyond suffrage. While functions and
power may be divided within the corporate state, the latter retains
a monopoly of legal power. The state represents the people, but
because it is not organically related to the people it is also capable
of acting against them as an autonomous corporation. For this
reason specific protections against state action are needed, and
these must be stated in the Constitution itself.
Briefly detailing these two "theories" of representation is im-
portant for several reasons. The agency theory implies that the re-
lations between state and federal government are relations among
four different agents of a national sovereign people who, in their
wisdom, saw fit to distribute functions and powers in this way. The
agency theory thus plays down the significance of the corporate-
state. The corporate-state version, however, regards the creation of
a federal union as an act affecting the several states only to the
limited extent specified in the Constitution. The agency theory
depends crucially on the idea of national popular sovereignty; the
corporate-state theory either denies it or gives it another more
limited meaning.
Both versions of constitutional representation agree that the
Constitution stands between the people and their representatives,
and in both versions the question of legitimacy and political re-
sponsibility are central. The two differ, however, on whether re-
sponsibility for official malfeasance is to be corporate or individual.
Both notions of responsibility present serious legal complexities.
1979]
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The agency notion implies that agents are personally responsible
for unauthorized action, but assumes that this responsibility is de-
pendent on common law rules of civil liability. In the corporate-
state version, the state represents the people and individual officers
represent the state, but the question of when unauthorized action
binds the state is not really solved until the early 20th century, and
the more abstract question of who represents the people when the
state acts against the people in its capacity as an autonomous corpo-
ration has never been solved at all.
This brief sketch of a line of American political thought began
with the most fundamental issues of continuity and representation,
developed into the two "theories" of representation in the Federal
Constitution, and ended by identifying the questions of judicial
legitimacy and corporate responsibility as major political and legal
concerns at the end of the 18th century. The questions of legiti-
macy and responsibility are at the heart of Chisholm v. Georgia"s
and the eleventh amendment; the sketch of American political
thought culminates in the case and the amendment, and the specific
legal problem of attribution and vindication begins there. In the
following sections I will try to understand the legal doctrines of
attribution and vindication in their relation to problems of repre-
sentation and continuity, the two "theories" of representation, and
the questions of legitimacy and responsibility.
D. Continuity and Corporate-State Responsibility
The heart of Chisholm is that a court of the United States
may legitimately hold a state of the Union corporately responsible.
The import of the eleventh amendment's reversal of the case re-
mains mysterious precisely because it is not clear whether it re-
jected judicial legitimacy or corporate responsibility. To be sure,
it is formally an amendment to article III jurisdiction, but cases
through the 19th century provide considerable evidence that it
intended a rejection of corporate responsibility. That is, I suggest
that the amendment was written in terms of judicial legitimacy
because the problem of corporate responsibility could not be solved
at the time, and perhaps remains unsolvable. There are several
related reasons for the historical conundrum regarding respon-
sibility.
15. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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First, the two constitutional theories of representation-the
theory of agency and the theory of the corporate-state-were hardly
neat, clearly stated "theories." Federalist doctrine favored the
agency notion because it fit nicely with the postulate of national
popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. But federalist
doctrine tended to undermine the prestige and independence of
the states. The postulate of a national popular sovereignty, coupled
with the general 18th century belief in the indivisibility of sover-
eignty, left state governments without any independent political
base. In federalist theory, state governments received their power
by delegation from national to local populations. Antifederalists,
therefore, tended to favor the corporate state theory.
Second, antifederalist reliance on the corporate-state theory
presented a most complex problem in the context of Chisholm.
The theory held that the corporate-state represented the people
in the several states. This implied that the corporate-state existed
legitimately only as representative of the people; since it had no
autonomous existence, it was incapable of acting against the people,
or at least incapable of being held responsible when it did so. When
the "state" acted against the people, responsibility had to be located
elsewhere-in agents acting in the name of the state. In this way
the antifederalists used the federalist theory of agency to distance
corporate-state responsibility.
Third, the federalist theory of agency was itself plainly incon-
sistent with the corporate-state responsibility upon which Chisholm
insisted. Federalists were prepared to use the corporate-state theory
in order to hold the states responsible because the several states
were not sovereign, but they could hardly do so consistent with a
belief in a "stateless" society of the people and their agents.
Finally, since the action in Chisholm was for money debt the
people of Georgia would ultimately pay the award. In dealing with
this aspect of the case neither theory of representation was of much
help. The agency theory was entirely irrelevant in the terms in
which it was generally understood. The corporate-state theory had
to concede that in contracting the debt as well as in paying it
(should there be an award) the state was representing the people
and not acting against them as an autonomous corporation; hence
the question presented did not involve the responsibility of the
autonomous corporate-state.
The eleventh amendment was a partial victory for the corpo-
rate-state theory and the notion of divisible sovereignity. But the
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victory was not total; 16 in a real sense the amendment was also a
victory for the agency theory of representation. In the following
paragraphs I will argue that the amendment encouraged work-
ing through a legal doctrine that firmly embedded the theory of
agency in American constitutional law. The complex doctrinal
story may be summarized as follows. Since after the eleventh
amendment neither the several states nor the federal government
could be held corporately responsible, the legal burden fell on
agents. What changed over time was the relationship between the
people and their agents. In original federalist theory, this relation-
ship was mediated by the Constitution, but otherwise it was di-
16. See Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regula-
tion: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARv. L. Rnv. 682
(1976). In his effort to reconcile the eleventh amendment cases, Professor Tribe makes two
essential arguments that oversimplify the historical context. He argues that the drafters
of the constitutional plan (1) established or recognized a divisible (federal-state) sover-
eignty; and (2) understood that the Congress would be more representative of state interests
than the judiciary. On the first point he relies entirely on Hamilton in TiE FEDERALIST
No. 81, but according to Professor Goebel, Hamilton was there arguing to the narrow
point of Supreme Court superiority; his comments on state sovereignty should not be read
broadly. 1 J. GOEBEL, O.W. HoLmEs DEvisE HISTORY OF THE SuPREME COURT Or THE UNrrED
STATES 313-16 (1971).
More generally, the antifederalists never accepted federalist efforts to explain their
theory of "coequal sovereignties" and had on their side the accepted historical "truth"
that sovereignty was indivisible. James Wilson's argument that sovereignty remained in
the people as a whole reconciled the two factions only if one accepted a state "sovereignty"
delegated by the national population. Professor Tribe makes the mistake of assuming that
a question more or less settled by the Civil War was settled by the original Constitution.
See G. WooD, supra note 6, at 524-36.
As to the second argument, the superior representative capacity of the Congress, Tribe
disregards the significance of the federalist theory of agency. "The Federalists . . . had
transformed political power into an indistinguishable agency of the people ... I." Id. at
549. He cites Tm FEDERADisr No. 46 (J. Madison), for the proposition that "Congress will
be attentive to concerns of state governments as separate sovereigns," 89 HARv. L. Rcv. at
695, but THE FEDERALISr No. 46 opens with a statement of the general agency notion.
Furthermore, its paean to Congressional solicitude is difficult to square with the broadside
attack on "legislative usurpation and oppression" in THE rEDERALisr No. 47 (J. Madison).
My argument in the text is that the constitutional structure is ambivalent on basic
issues of representation, responsibility and legitimacy. Notwithstanding Tribe's tour de
force to the contrary, the ambivalence is our inheritance; witness the recent case of Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), involving congressional extension of
wage and hour protection to public employees. The Supreme Court felt moved to inter-
vene on behalf of state and local governments, though the latter were adequately repre-
sented in the Congress that passed the bill. The point is made by Justice Brennan,
dissenting, id. at 876-77 (citing Tm FEDERALIST Nos. 45 and 46 (J. Madison)).
In his recent paper Unraveling National League of Cities, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1065
(1977), Professor Tribe purports to reaffirm these views with friendly footnote citation, id.
at 1071 n.26, 1074 n.36. But the text tells a different story. "As long as judges do not fully
and irrevocably repudiate the possibility of ever rejecting majoritarian political and eco-
nomic choices, there is no honest way for them to escape the burdens of substantive judg-
ment in every case. We may well believe that unelected judges will sometimes perform
that task badly. But so will anyone else, including legislators. True, they are elected-but
they cannot avoid being as removed from their constituents as are most judges." Id. at 1087.
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rect.17 However, as a consequence of the partial victory of the
corporate-state theory reflected in the amendment, through the
19th century the relationship between the people and their agents
became further mediated by the corporate-state: agents were agents
of the state, not of the people directly. In the post-Civil War period
this attenuation posed some very difficult problems.
E. Representation and Agency
The sense in which the eleventh amendment encouraged a
doctrine that firmly embedded the agency theory of representation
in American legal thought is this: After passage of that amend-
ment, vindication of claims arising from official (state) action had
to take the form of personal actions against the official. Plaintiffs
gained no legal advantage from attempting to attribute the action
of the agent to the state. Indeed, before the 1870's there was no
plaintiff's doctrine of state attribution; there were no "state action"
cases in the modern sense. Actions against officers of the several
states were brought under common counts; state action entered the
case defensively as confession and avoidance by way of legal justifi-
cation. The Dartmouth College case for example, was an action
in trover "for the book of records, corporate seal, and other corpo-
rate property .... The jury found Woodward liable for $20,000
if the New Hampshire acts amending the college charter were
found unconstitutional. Because Woodward died before the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court was announced, judgment nunc pro
tunc for that amount plus costs was entered against him by the
Court.'
17. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), it was apparently argued that
the real party defendant was the people of Georgia, "and when their agents are unfaithful,
the acts of those agents cease to be obligatory." Id. at 132. Chief Justice Marshall re-
sponded "that the people can act only by these agents, and that, while within the powers
conferred on them, their acts must be considered as the acts of the people. If the agents
be corrupt, others may be chosen ...." Id. at 132-33.
18. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 624 (1819).
In addition, Providence Bank v. Billings & Pittman, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830) and
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861), were both actions in tres-
pass against sheriffs and treasurers who had seized funds from the banks in default of tax
payments, the banks claiming tax immunity under their corporate charters. Defendants
sought to avoid judgment for the conversion by relying on the state legislation which
plaintiffs claimed, in replication, impaired the obligation of contract.
19. Pre-1875 cases were, of course, initiated in state court absent diversity of citizen-
ship. The structure of these early cases was, therefore, the same whether the defendant
was a state or federal officer. For example, compare Dartmouth College with Palmer v.
Allen, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 550 (1813), a Connecticut action for assault and battery and
false imprisonment against a deputy United States marshal.
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After the Civil War, confusion arose when the famous case of
In re Ayers0 summarized the legal posture of the parties in a
partially modern way: (1) the claimant alleged that defendant was
acting on behalf of the state; (2) the constitutional claim stripped
the defendant's act of its official jurisdiction and (3) left it as a "per-
sonal act of the individual" that violates a common law right "for
which plaintiff is entitled to a remedy against the wrongdoer in his
individual character." Throughout the century the claim of un-
lawful state action had functioned only to rebut the defense of
agency.2 1 The confusion generated by the first point in the Ayers
formulation was a consequence of the effort, in post-1875 cases,
to plead federal subject matter jurisdiction. Before Ex parte Young
the effort ran into trouble. On the one hand, so long as attribution
and vindication were personal, the action of the agent was attri-
buted to him in his personal capacity and not as representative,
and the mode of vindication-the remedy-ran against the officer
personally. Consequently, there could be no federal jurisdiction.
On the other hand, where the plaintiff alleged federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, he ran afoul of the eleventh amendment. Arguing
before the Supreme Court, counsel for Ayers posed the crucial
question:
In the Virginia cases, . . . this court held that every officer of a
State who acted for the State in the execution of its laws was the
State under the Fourteenth Amendment. Shall the State be bound
for their act and yet their act not be the State's under the immunity
of the Eleventh Amendment? 22
20. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
21. The following two examples indicate the marginal survival of this 19th century
structure: "When it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power, federal officials are
usually governed by local law. Federal Law, however, supplies the defense, if the conduct
complained of was done pursuant to a federally imposed duty, or immunity from suit."
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, they argue, petitioner may obtain money damages to redress inva-
sion of these rights only by an action in tort, under state law, in the state courts.
In this scheme the Fourth Amendment would serve merely to limit the extent to
which agents could defend the state law tort suit by asserting that their actions
were a valid exercise of federal power: if the agents were shown to have violated
the Fourth Amendment, such a defense would be lost to them ....
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-91 (1971).
22. 123 U.S. at 465 (citation omitted). The significance of Ayers may be less than
commonly supposed. Plaintiffs there alleged that the state had issued tax coupons that
were negotiable and acceptable in payment of state taxes. Ayers, as attorney general, was
bringing suit under claim of statutory authority against individuals who attempted to use
the coupons to discharge state tax obligations. Plaintiffs claimed that these suits destroyed
negotiability and that the authorizing statute impaired the obligation of contract; an in-
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Through most of the 19th century, therefore, legitimate judicial
intervention was confined to enforcing the personal responsibility
of officials; attribution and vindication were personal when a repre-
sentative acted beyond his agency authority.
F. Responsibility and Attribution
The eleventh amendment marked a partial victory for the
corporate-state theory of representation, while the 19th century
"state action" cases worked out the legal form of the agency theory.
Taken together they provided the basis for a new solution to a set
of old problems that were revived after the Civil War. These prob-
lems involved the distinction between the state as representative
of the people and the state as an autonomous corporation capable
of acting against the people, the related problem of state corporate
responsibility, and the positioning of the corporate-state between
the people and their agents.
The fourteenth amendment plainly recognizes the possibility
of an autonomous corporate-state acting against the people by
denying rights: it makes action under color of state law the basis
of liability, and this establishes its direct confrontation with the
eleventh amendment. Until Ex parte Young no principled resolu-
tion appeared to answer the question posed by Ayers' counsel. On
the one hand, if the question of attribution remained tied to forms
of personal vindication, the case could proceed on the agency
theory and the fourteenth amendment could be ignored. On the
other, hand, if vindication were tied to official attribution, the
junction against Ayers was prayed for. First, the Court had a great deal of trouble with the
cause of action as a matter of contract law. The proceedings initiated by Ayers wyere "no
breach of any contract subsisting between complainants and the State of Virginia." Fur-
ther, the destruction of negotiability and general loss in market value were
not direct and legal consequences of any breach of the contract made with the
State of Virginia .... As such damage could not be recovered in a direct action
upon the contract, if the State were suable at law, so neither can it be made the
foundation of any preventive relief by injunction.
Id. at 496. Second, the Court viewed the contract clause as conferring individual rights
only indirectly and incidentally .... In any judicial proceeding necessary to vin-
dicate his rights under a contract affected by such legislation, the individual has
a right to have a judicial determination declaring the nullity of the attempt to
impair its obligation. This is the only right secured to him by that clause of the'
Constitution.
Id. at 504 (quoting Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1884)). The model case is plainly
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Given this view of actionability under the
contract clause, Young may be distinguished as a fourteenth amendment case; it does not
necessarily overrule Ayers.
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corporate-state could be held responsible and the eleventh amend-
ment would be ignored. But the two aspects could be split so that
attribution reflected corporate-state responsibility while vindica-
tion reflected agent responsibility. The significance of Ex parte
Young lies precisely in its firm resolve to split attribution from
vindication and not in its abandonment of reliance on common law
rights in favor of a federal cause of action,23 or in its shift from
common law forms of action to equitable intervention.2 4 After
1908 no one claimed that it was incoherent to hold an agent per-
sonally liable for acting as an agent of the state.
Attributing the action of agents to the state was possible only
with firm acceptance of the view that the corporate-state stood be-
tween the people and their agents. The unconstitutional acts of an
agent had to be attributed to the corporate-state, not to the people.
But neither splitting the question of attribution from the question
of vindication, nor inserting the corporate-state between the people
and their agents, solved the problem of the corporate-state's dual
character as representative of the people and as autonomous corpo-
ration capable of acting against the people. This is a serious
conceptual problem. First, it is possible to read the eleventh amend-
ment as barring actions against the state only when the state is
acting as representative of the people. Since the state cannot repre-
sent the people when it acts against them by denying fourteenth
amendment rights, the eleventh amendment vanishes in the face
of a state action claim. Second, it is possible to read the fourteenth
23. P. BATOR, P. MisHEIN, D. SHAPIRo & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
E COURTS AiND Tr FEDERAL SYsrEm 935 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WEcHSLER].
24. See Tribe, supra note 16, at 687 n.26. Both Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869), and Pacific R.R. v. Maguire, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 36 (1873), were
bills in equity for injunctive relief against tax collectors, claiming that the tax violated
the contract clause. In Rouse the Court said:
[W]e are of the opinion that the State of Missouri did make a contract on suf-
ficient consideration with the Home of the Friendless, to exempt the property of
the corporation from taxation, and that the attempt made [to collect the tax]
on behalf of the State through its authorized agent, notwithstanding this agree-
ment .... cannot be allowed.
75 US. (8 Wall.) at 438-39 (emphasis added).
25. This is but one aspect of a far more general phenomenon of modern political
institutions.
[I]n the liberal design the state was to be an instrumentality of the society rather
than vice versa-an instrumentality specialized in the exercise of rule over the
society. If this conception involves an implicit contradiction (how can the state
both serve the society and rule over it?), the explanation for it lies in the fact that
the society was not a fused but a split reality.
G. POGGI, THE DFvEtOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 118-19 (1978).
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amendment as being addressed to the states as autonomous corpora-
tions and not as representatives of the people. But this reading
leaves open the question of who represents the people in the several
states when the state acts autonomously. In an ordinary state action
case like Young, an attorney for the state typically represents the
named agent-defendant. But if the state is acting as an autonomous
corporation, its interests are not isomorphic with those of the
people. Who represents the people?
The problem of the dual character of the corporate-state was
to be "solved" in Home Telephone & Telegraph v. City of Los
Angeles26 by simply importing an "apparent authority" notion
from agency law and making the question of actual authority ir-
relevant. This case recognizes that the corporate-state speaks with
many voices; the defendant's may be but an illegal murmur in a
chorus of constitutional compliance. For the purposes of attribu-
tion, it matters only that the defendant have apparent state au-
thority; that he act under color of law. Accepting mer'e apparent
authority as a basis for attributing agency action to the state had
avoided condemnation of the corporate-state as such. Avoiding di-
rect corporate condemnation also avoided the question of the repre-
sentative relation of the corporate-state to the people. Finally, since
apparent authority was relevant only to the question of attribution,
litigation could proceed on the otherwise fictional premise that the
case was brought against the agent personally. This fiction 7 was
preserved by splitting attribution and vindication: attribution was
official, but the form of vindication remained personal.
In summary, I have argued that the paradoxical relationship
between the eleventh amendment and the fourteenth amendment
was "resolved" by the construction of three Live Boundaries.
26. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
27. On the "fiction" of Ex parte Young, see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93, 106-20
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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I. Responsibility could be attributed to the officer personally or
to the state; vindication could run against the officer person-
ally or against the state. Ex parte Young took one from each:
Attribution
Personal[ State Pers
Vindication
onal I State
II. Young also rejected the notion that responsibility had to be
attributed to either the people or their agents. Instead it read
the fourteenth amendment as situating the corporate-state
between the two:
People Agents
I Corporate-State I
III. Points I and II above, by attributing responsibility to the
state for acts against the people, brought to the surface the
problem of the dual character of the corporate-state that was
"solved" by the Home Telephone case:
State as Representative State as Enemy
of the People of the People
Apparent Authority
G. Legitimacy and Vindication
I argued earlier that the eleventh amendment was probably
framed in terms of judicial legitimacy because the problem of
corporate responsibility could not be solved. Behind the question
of corporate responsibility was the question of the relationship of
the corporate-state to the people in the several states. Behind that
relationship was the problem of the divisibility of sovereignty and
the role of the federal government in protecting rights. One of the
major concerns of the early federalists was that states would not
respect minority (property) rights, and protection of these rights
was an aspect of the general good that political society would secure
for civil society. The federalists were certain that in protecting
(property) rights the Constitution would place federal agents be-
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tween state agents (or the corporate-state) and the people in the
several states, and that this would require constitutional interpre-
tation. The separation of powers within the federal government
was thus tied to federalism by identifying the protection of rights
with the general good, and by the notion of national popular sov-
ereignty. In plainest terms, judicial intervention in state affairs did
not necessarily protect the people of the state from their state gov-
ernment in any concrete sense, but it served the general good of the
national population by enforcing abstract rights. Federal judicial
intervention is thus the historical manifestation of the old federalist
belief in the necessity for political society to create a virtuous civil
society. Thus, it is inevitable that in concrete cases, judicial inter-
vention for the general good and popular sovereignty (that is, the
actual will of the people as manifested in politics) tend to confront
each other as contradictions. Because of this confrontation, judicial
legitimacy becomes problematic. But this problem too was to be
"resolved" by forms of mediation implicit in Ex parte Young.
In the normal state action case after Ex parte Young, attribu-
tion is official but vindication is personal. This personal form of
vindication became the accepted fictional mechanism through
which state law or policy is judicially manipulated. Federal inter-
vention is thus mediated through two forms that roughly reflect
the agency and the corporate-state theories of representation. The
form of vindication is personal, which means that the order runs
against a particular officer. This formalism preserves legitimacy
by placing the judiciary between the people and nonjudicial agents
in accordance with the constitutional plan to commit the control
of agents to other agents. In addition, the federal judiciary is placed
between the corporate-state and an undifferentiated civil society-
undifferentiated in that the people in the several states are not dis-
tinguished from the (sovereign) national population.28 The prob-
lem with damage actions against the state is that they undermine
these two forms of mediation.
28. "The statute under which this action was brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), es-
tablished in our law the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal
rights against state power." Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322, 355-56 (1975) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). Indeed, "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). See also Zwichler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-48 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-73
(1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). For a different articulation of this mediation
at the level of doctrine, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. Rv. 67, 80-81 (1960).
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First, damage actions against the state destroy the brilliant
tour de force of Ex parte Young by assimilating attribution and
vindication. That is, a damage action against the state no longer
holds vindication personal. Attribution and vindication must both
be official.
Second, the form of the action raises the question whether the
wrongful act or policy is to be attributed to the state acting as repre-
sentative of the people, or in its capacity as an autonomous corpora-
tion acting against the people. Since the money to pay the judgment
must, inevitably, come from the people, both constructions lead in
the same direction. Either the state was acting as representative of
the people when it denied them rights, or the people are respon-
sible for the actions of the autonomous corporate-state. In either
view, the action for damages requires that the judiciary directly
confront the people in the several states.
Third, directly confronting the people in the several states and
holding them responsible for a denial of rights tends to confirm
the constitutional theory of agency. That is, a state agent acting for
the people in the several states did wrong, and the Constitution
committed the control of agents to other agents-here the federal
judiciary.
Fourth, this direct confrontation turns agency against the
people and thus raises the problem of sovereignty: How may the
federal judiciary, which is an agent of the people, hold the people
responsible for the actions of other agents? To be sure, there are
at least two simplistic answers. One is that the people in the several
states are not sovereign. Since only the national collectivity is sov-
ereign, there is no special incongruity in the people of a state being
held responsible by a federal agency: the ruled have not turned
against the rulers. The other simplistic answer is that the sovereign
people established the Constitution as a legal device that would
mediate between the people and their agents. So long as the federal
judiciary enforces the Constitution in a colorably valid way within
the damage action, it acts properly as an agent of the sovereign
people and not against them.
Finally, the damage action realizes the old federalist belief in
the necessity for political society to impose virtue on civil society.
The people of the state, having acted through state agents to deny
rights, must be brought to virtue by federal (judicial) agents.
All of these implications may be understood as aspects of a
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single phenomenon. The splitting of attribution and vindication
avoided a confrontation between abstract ideas of politics and law
and the concrete realities of power and values. That is:
So long as the distinction between civil and political
society remains abstract it can be lived with, but the distinction
is troublesome when it means placing the majority of a population
under a judicial order to pay damages to a minority of a popula-
tion.29
The "split" or "dual" sovereignty notion, regarded as
crucial to American federalism, works tolerably well until it be-
comes the central issue in a dispute over concrete issues of power
or values.
One need not choose between the two constitutional the-
ories of representation-the agency theory and the corporate-state
theory-so long as their implications remain abstract, but if one
theory or the other determines the outcome of a question of re-
sponsibility or power, the issues must be resolved. The "coherence"
of American politics depends on knowing whether officials are di-
rect agents of the people or are agents of a corporate-state that
represents the people but is capable of acting against them.
The difficulty of resolving abstract ideas of politics and law
in concrete circumstances of power and values helps explain the
tendency to treat questions of responsibility as though they were
questions of legitimacy. I mentioned earlier that the eleventh
amendment may have been written in terms of judicial legitimacy
because the question of corporate responsibility was so difficult.30
The fourteenth amendment was written in terms of corporate re-
sponsibility, but it did not foresee what this would mean for legiti-
macy. The tendency to treat questions of responsibility as questions
of legitimacy can be seen at work in the two major contemporary
social issues of crime and race. In law, the problem of crime be-
comes the issue of police control; the problem of race focuses on
school segregation. In turn, the issue of police control is narrowed
to the troublesome remedy of the exclusionary rule; school segrega-
tion is narrowed to bussing. Bussing and the exclusionary rule
quickly become issues of judicial legitimacy.
29. This would have been the case in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). For
an elaboration of Edelman's formalism, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 US. 678, 689-93 (1978).
30. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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H. Recent Developments
Fitzpatrick v. Bitze 1 illustrates the tendency of issues of re-
sponsibility to become issues of legitimacy. The case is factually
simple. The 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 brought state employees within its terms, and provided
employees with a right to recover money damages against the states
as employers in violation of Title VII. The eleventh amendment
was asserted as a bar to the federal suit. The Supreme Court held
that the eleventh amendment was "necessarily limited by the en-
forcement provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 2
In enacting the 1972 amendments, Congress had acted under sec-
tion 5, and in doing so had lifted the eleventh amendment bar.
All prior cases raising the issue in the context of damage actions
against the states could be explained by the absence of congres-
sional action under section 5. Hence, the issue had never been one
of state responsibility, but merely one of judicial legitimacy.
For its interpretation of the fourteenth amendment in general,
and section 5 in particular, the Court relied almost exclusively on
Ex parte Virginia.88 This important case was read as providing the
solution rather than setting the terms of the problem. Recall the
question of counsel in In re Ayers: How shall the complainant
allege state action and yet not be subject to the eleventh amend-
ment bar? The answer given by the Court in Fitzpatrick, reading
the fourteenth amendment through Ex parte Virginia, is that the
amendment worked a profound shift in power to the federal gov-
ernment: that this "addition of power to the general government
involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers
of the States. It is carved out of them. ' 34 Ex parte Virfginia, of
course, was concerned with the relationship between the states and
the "general government"; it said nothing about the impact of the
fourteenth amendment on the separation of powers within the
general government. The Fitzpatrick opinion implies that "general
government" should be read as "Congress"; that the fourteenth
amendment transformed an issue of federalism into an issue of the
separation of powers. 5 This transformation raises a number of
problems not addressed in Fitzpatrick.
31. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
22. Id. at 456.
33. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
34. Id. at 346.
35. Professor Tribe attributes this transformation to the eleventh amendment itself.
"'jt remains true after the eleventh amendment, just as it was true prior to Clisholm,
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Since the eleventh amendment was written as an amendment
to the judicial power set forth in article III, it has never been sup-
posed that Congress is free to grant that which the Constitution
(as so amended) withheld. On its narrow holding, Marbury v.
Madison8 remains rather solid constitutional law. To the extent
that it does, Marbury must mean that since the eleventh amend-
ment removed federal judicial power over states in suits by private
parties, the judicial power of Article III no longer extends to such
cases, and Congress may not grant jurisdiction beyond the terms of
that article as amended.8 7 In transforming an issue of federalism
into one of separation of powers, the Fitzpatrick Court implicitly
rejected this line of argument. It read the fourteenth amendment
as. amending the eleventh by restoring the withdrawn judicial
power, but the Court denied that the restoration was self-execut-
ing; it could not be exercised without an act of Congress. There
are two critical difficulties with this reading of the three constitu-
tional provisions at issue. First, the judicial power in article III
has never been regarded as self-executing; federal judicial jurisdic-
tion is statutory 8 Second, the separation of powers thesis in Fitz-
patrick disregards the original significance of the eleventh amend-
ment; the separation of powers thesis implies that its aim could
have been readily accomplished by simple amendment to the Judi-
cialry Act of 1789.2"
Again, it is important not to lose the major point. Structural
discussion of the relation between congressional and judicial power
in this context has general significance for two reasons. First, such
discussion implicitly concedes that federalism and the separation
of powers are related properties of American constitutional govern-
ment.40 Second, it tends to shift the focus of discussion and interest
from the former to the latter, so that issues of responsibility be-
come issues of legitimacy.
that Congress . . . can effectuate the valid substantive purposes of federal law by (1) com-
pelling states to submit to adjudication in federal courts . L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
srIrurIoNAL LAW § 3-37, at 139 (1978).
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
37. I am aware of the Tidewater problem, but read broadly that case overrules
Marbuiy. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460-84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). To be sure, conferring jurisdiction by state waiver of immunity introduces
an anomaly into article M jurisprudence.
38. For views to the contrary, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 313-15.
39. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
40. But see Elrod v. Burns, 427 US. 347, 352 (1976) (plurality opinion by Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall & White, JJ.) ("the separation-of-powers principle like the political
question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the States.).
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In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer the state appears as an employer. This
suggests two lines of thought. First, as an employer, the state acts
as an autonomous corporation delivering services. Corporate-state
activities of this sort have frequently raised problems of federal-
state relations, and almost as frequently have been resolved by a
functional analysis suggesting the capacity of the corporate-state
to act as a quasi-private corporation.41 This line of thought raises
the question whether Fitzpatrick means that the people are to be
held responsible for the quasi-private acts of the corporate-state.
Second, Fitzpatrick does not answer the question of the scope of
congressional power where the state acts as an agent of the people.
Is congressional power over vindication as broad as the attribution
doctrine of "state action"? I suppose a case similar to Monroe v.
Pape,2 in which a state officer violates state and federal law simul-
taneously, and there is no indication of a state policy supporting
the officer. The question is whether Congress may provide for
damage actions against the state in this situation. Fitzpatrick does
not in terms establish a doctrine of vindication as broad as the doc-
trine of attribution set forth in Home Telephone and Telegraph
v. Los Angeles. 43
41. E.g., Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279
(1973); Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572 (1946). But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
42. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
43. 227 U.S. 278 (1913). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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H. QuASI-IN-RFM JURISDICTION*
fntroduction
The problem of party jurisdiction cannot be properly under-
stood in terms of issues such as "fair notice" or "territorial sover-
eignty." Rather, the story of the rise and fall of Pennoyer v. Neff"
is part of a long, and perhaps unconcluded,45 struggle with the
distinction between property relations and social relations. I will
make two basic points. First, Pennoyer did not erect a Vacuum
Boundary between in rem and in personam jurisdiction, though
the case has been read in that way. A Vacuum Bounded structure
would have presented serious difficulties in dealing with the com-
mon run of contemporary cases. I shall argue that Pennoyer articu-
lated a Live Boundary structure that had been developing for 200
years. Characteristically, the middle space in this structure, what
we now call quasi-in-rem46 jurisdiction, was most important be-
cause it reflected the ambiguity of the distinction between social
relations and property relations.47
Second, I shall attempt to show that the consistent course of
the case law from the late 18th century through the end of the
19th century elaborated and enlarged the category of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction. All the problem cases-the cases worth litigating-in-
volved jurisdiction quasi-in-rem. Furthermore, these cases involved
legislative enlargements of the scope of state court jurisdiction con-
fronting a more or less reluctant judiciary. Finally, the core sub-
stance of this middle category was the action of debt.
* My thanks to Mary Frances Clark for her research assistance.
44. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
45. See e.g., Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 216 N.E.2d S12, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
Seider has, however, survived the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) ex-
tending "minimum contact" analysis to the question of presence for purposes of quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978); Baden
v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 NXE.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978). See also note 100 &
accompanying text infra.
46. Justice Field uses the phrase in Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886). I have
not found an earlier reported case in which the phrase appears. It is not in the 5th edition
of C. DRArAx, THE LAw oF Surfs By ATrACHMENT (1878), but appears in the 7th (1891)
edition at § 448a.
47. On the treatment of this distinction in Blackstone, see Kennedy, supra note 11,
at Part IV. An equally difficult distinction between personal rights and property rights
appears in the context of the Civil Rights jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1976). See
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 493,
581 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring); Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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A. Duality
Consider the following contemporary critique of Pennoyer:
Its inadequacy as a general theory can be summarized as follows:
whereas an object is "property" because people have legal claims
to it, and any legal claim for material redress is a claim to be com-
pensated in property, Pennoyer requires the impossibility of think-
ing of property without an owner and compensation without
payment.48
There are several problems with this critique. It is always tempting
to castigate the thought of another time because it is so easy to do-
easier, at least, than to understand it from the perspective of that
time. The quoted passage criticizes the opinion in Pennoyer for
failing to see that social relations and property relations are re-
versible.49 But this is like sneering at the Romans for failing to
understand that slaves are people with equal rights, or finding
quaint the medieval conception of the "King's Two Bodies," or
attributing a seriously truncated intelligence to those 18th century
thinkers who held that sovereignty could not by its nature be sub-
ject to limiting principles. Maitland once remarked upon "the vast
gulf which to our minds divides the 'give me what I own' and 'give
me what I am owed',""0 but he did not criticize 12th century law-
yers for failing to note this "obvious" distinction.r1
There is a real sense in which Pennoyer did in fact treat social
relations and property relations as reversible, however. Since state
court jurisdiction could be founded on power over either persons
or property the two could be considered as functional equivalents,
though judgments based on one or the other might have different
consequences. The general proposition that state court judgments
should have extra-territorial consequences had been established at
least since the Articles of Confederation. Extra-territorial effect
was not an issue in principle. The disputed question was whether
a state court could secure power over a person by seizing his
property. The 19th century jurisdiction cases clearly indicate that
property could be substituted for persons and vice versa.
The reversibility of persons and property was only partial and
48. Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 281.
49. In Piaget's sense: A reversible operation changes the form of a constant substance.
See his PsYcHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY (A. Rosin trans. 1971).
50. Compare Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) with Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l
Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917).
51. T. PLUCKNEIr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAie 362 (5th ed. 1956).
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limited, and this limited reversibility constituted the core of the
problem of party jurisdiction in the 19th century. All of the hard
cases for one hundred years prior to Pennoyer involve either of two
problems of reversibility: May power over property be substituted
for power over the person of the defendant; does the case at hand
involve social relations or property relations. 2
Understanding the Pennoyer "system" requires more than a
catalogue of logical flaws; it requires, at least, asking some ques-
tions about the sort of problem with which Pennoyer might have
been concerned.
B. Injustice
The Pennoyer Court could not have been concerned with in-
justice in the sense that it perceived existing doctrine as treating
a class of litigants unfairly. Cases truly in personam were not a
problem because in those cases the defendant was actually served
or voluntarily appeared, or both. In personam actions in equity
had routinely affected title to lands located outside the jurisdiction
since the 17th century; since the defendant was present he could
be ordered to take action affecting the status of the foreign land. 3
Suits in personam presented some problems in early 19th century
American equity cases affecting title to lands located in other
states. Doctrinal nuance aside, the matter seems to have been sub-
52. The two problems are not always readily distinguished-as where plaintiff claims
under a contract which provides that in return for land improvement services a parcel
thereof is to be conveyed to him. The complaint may include both a count for specific
performance of the contract to convey and an action for debt, with jurisdiction secured
by attachment of the property. See Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 (1850).
53. See Arglasse v. Muschamp, 23 Eng. Rep. 322 (Oh. 1682). To be sure, there were
doctrinal limits to the exercise of this power. For example, where petitioner was a joint
tenant and the bill prayed for an accounting and partition of lands located in Ireland, the
Chancellor denied jurisdiction over the latter on the ground that it was in the nature of
a common law writ and would not lie for foreign lands. Cartwright v. Pettus, 22 Eng. Rep.
916 (Ch. 1675). These doctrinal limitations appear to have been elaborated through the
18th century. For example, equity would not order the delivery of possession in foreign
lands, Roberdeau v. Rous, 26 Eng. Rep. 342 (Oh. 1738); nor would it direct the specific
distribution of a legacy in Scotland, Provost of Edinborough v. Aubery, 27 Eng. Rep. 157
(Ch. 1753); nor would it take jurisdiction in probate where the estate was either in the
colonies or plantations because the substantive law was different, whereas the general
principles of equity were the same everywhere. See Burn v. Cole, 27 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch.
1762), Pike v. Hoare, 27 Eng. Rep. 286 (Ch. 1763). That these cases in no way affected the
general principle is clear from the fact that they fall on both sides of the famous case of
Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750), which upheld jurisdiction over a
bill for the specific performance of Articles entered into between the parties in England
and stipulating the location of the Maryland-Pennsylvania border. As a doctrinal matter
the cases were plainly distinguishable.
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stantially settled by 181 0. 54 Cases truly in rem were not a problem
because the ancient fiction that seizure of the property constituted
constructive notice was never questioned. Cases quasi-in-rem had
always been more troublesome and there is rhetoric about injustice
in a number of cases earlier in the century. Nevertheless, a mere
seven years before Pennoyer the Court had decided a tort case -
an otherwise classic in personam form of actionr6 -where jurisdic-
tion over the absent tortfeasor was secured by the seizure of his
local property with notice effected by publication. The case deals
with the scope of the judgment as a major issue, but there is no
indication that anyone thought it was unjust for the state to sub-
ject the property to forced sale as a consequence of its owner's
failure to appear and defend in the tort suit.
Pennoyer iterates the truism that without actual service on the
person or seizure of his property state courts are without judicial
power; but that had been true for well over a century in both
English and American courts. The outcome of many of these cases
may have been unfair, but it is difficult to find cases from this
period which perceive any unfairness in applying accepted doc-
trine.6 7 It may be true that "the law in 1877 with respect to notice
was in sorry condition, '5 8 but there are few doctrinal matters about
which that could not be said-then or now.
C. Notice
Even if Pennoyer was not concerned with injustice, it is at
least plausible that as a doctrinal matter notice had become a
critical issue. I shall frame the question as: Under what circum-
54. Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810) is an opinion by Marshall which
follows the English authority of Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750).
Where both parties were served and appearing, equity could act on the person of the
defendant even if the performance compelled affected title to out-of-state land. To this
extent jurisdiction over the person was reversible with jurisdiction over the land. Ward v.
Arredondo, 1 Hopk. Ch. 213 (N.Y. 1824) sustained equity jurisdiction when only the deed
was present in New York, and was thus wrongly decided in view of then current doctrine.
55. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870).
56. "[1]n the absence of statutory provision allowing attachments to issue in actions
founded on tort, it has been uniformly held, that in such actions it will not lie." C. Drnay,
THE LAw OF SUITS By ATTACHMENT § 10 (7th ed. 1891).
57. Thus the New York Court of Appeals: "We have not been referred to any
adjudications, holding that no man's right of property can be affected by a judicial pro.
ceeding unless he have personal notice." Matter of The Empire City Bank, 18 N.Y. 199,
215 (1858).
58. Hazard, supra note 48, at 252.
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stances was notice perceived as a serious problem of doctrine, and
how was this problem solved-if at all?
In the American cases from the end of the 18th century to
the Civil War three principles are completely accepted, though
variously articulated. First, notice to defendants, express or im-
plied, was a requirement of natural justice. Second, statutory ex-
ceptions to the common law were to be strictly construed. Third,
two kinds of defective judicial judgments existed: voidable judg-
ments containing an error of law but nonetheless binding on col-
lateral review; void judgments containing a jurisdictional defect
not binding on collateral review. All the cases worth litigating
prior to Pennoyer were decided according to one or more of these
principles.
The principle of notice as a requirement of natural justice has
a legal context without which it is incoherent. That legal context
is constituted by the litany of common law fictions which rendered
implied notice the equivalent of actual notice, thereby satisfying
natural justice. There is some dispute over whether the implied
notice generated by seizure of the res in true in rem cases was part
of the principle of natural justice or an exception to it. This un-
certainty is not very interesting because without doubt the implied
notice doctrine of true in rem cases was solidly based in the com-
mon law, and the common law was closely identified with natural
justice. More importantly, the uncertainty had no concrete con-
sequences because all of the enlargements of state court jurisdic-
tion which resulted in cases that made law were the result of legis-
lation. Since these expansions were statutory, the second principle
could be used.
Because extensions of state court jurisdiction were statutory
there was no occasion to deal with the question whether the stan-
dard doctrine of constructive notice applicable to true in rem cases
constituted an exception to the principle of natural justice or was
a part of it.59 Instead, it was well accepted early in the 19th century
that if the court rendering a default judgment complied with the
authorizing statute, strictly construed, that judgment was res judi-
cata or was to be given full faith and credit. Of course, lawyers
of the period had little difficulty finding procedural error or in-
sufficiency in the record. Had the principle of strict construction
been taken literally the underlying statutory provisions would have
59. Hazard, supra note 48, at 251.
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been nullified. It was necessary to distinguish among procedural
defects.
The third principle distinguished jurisdictional defects from
mere errors of law.60 Jurisdictional defects voided the judgment
while mere errors of law did not. No general statement can be
made about the sorts of defects considered jurisdictional; no gen-
eral concept seems to have been applied.
The implications of these three principles are clear. Cases
truly in rem raise no problem of notice because they arise under
common law doctrine and are therefore consistent with the prin-
ciple of natural justice. Cases truly in personam raise no problem
of notice because the defendant is actually served or voluntarily
appears, or both. The problem of notice arises entirely out of pro-
ceedings under statutes, and classically in actions of debt.6 ' If there
60. The distinction was not limited to the context of party jurisdiction. See Ex parte
Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). The
rule is stated in C. DAKE, THE LAW oF SutTs By A'rrACHMENT § 87a (5th ed. 1878).
61. Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is an outgrowth of the Custom of London, and by the
Custom'"all attachments are grounded on actions of debt." C. DRAKE, THE LAW oF Surrs
By ATrAcHMEIT § 9 (7th ed. 1891). American statutes modeled on the Custom, and
eventually extending it considerably, were enacted early in the 18th century. See note 65
infra.
In its nature this remedy is certainly anomalous. As it exists under the
custom of London, it has hardly any feature of a common-law proceeding. At
common law the first step in an action, without which no other can be taken,
is to obtain service of process on the defendant; under the custom, this is not
only not done, but it was declared by Lord Mansfield, that the very essence of the
custom is that the defendant shall not have notice. At common law a debtor's
property can be reached for the payment of his debt, only under a fieri facias;
under the custom, it is subjected to a preliminary attachment, under which it is
so held as to deprive the owner of control over it, until the plaintiff's claim be
secured or satisfied. At common law only tangible property can be subjected to
execution; under the custom, a debt due to the defendant is attached, and ap-
propriated to the payment of his debt. At common law, after obtaining judgment,
the plaintiff is entitled to execution without any further act on his part; under
the custom, he cannot have execution of the garnishee's debt, without giving
pledges to refund to the defendant the amount paid by the garnishee, if the
defendant, within a year and a day, appear and disprove the debt for which the
attachment is obtained.
In these and other respects the proceeding under the custom has an in-
dividuality entirely foreign to the common law. Its peculiar features have in the
main been preserved in its more enlarged and diversified development in this
country. The most material differences as it exists among us, are, the necessity of
notice to the defendant, either actual or constructive; the direct action of the
attachment on tangible property, as well as its indirect effect upon debts, and
upon property in the garnishee's hands; the necessity for the presentation of
special grounds for resort to it; and the requirement of a cautionary bond, to be
executed by the plaintiff and sureties, to indemnify the defendant against damage
resulting from the attachment. Still the remedy is, with us, regarded and treated
as sui generis, and is practically much favored in legislation, though, frequently
spoken of by courts as not entitled to peculiar favor at their hands.
C. DPa&xE, Tim LAW or Surrs By ATrAcHMENr § 4 (7th ed. 1891).
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was a problem of notice prior to Pennoyer the problematic situa-
tion was constituted by quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Moreover, the
procedural form of quasi-in-rem attachment reflects the ambiguity
of the underlying substantive relation: debt is ambiguously classi-
fied as a social obligation and as a property right.
One late 18th century case illustrates the fundamental struc-
ture because it does not involve a statute. In Phelps v. Holkerl
a creditor brought an action for debt in Massachusetts against the
absent debtor. The creditor attached a blanket belonging to his
debtor which was in the possession of a local third party. Judgment
for the creditor was by default, and the creditor brought suit on
the judgment in Pennsylvania to recover the deficiency. The issue
for the Pennsylvania court was whether the Massachusetts judg-
ment was prima facie or conclusive evidence of the debt under the
full faith and credit clause of the Articles of Confederation. Chief
Justice M'Kean said: "This is a proceeding in rem, and ought not
certainly to be extended further than the property attached." 68 The
Pennsylvania court agreed that the Massachusetts judgment was
only prima facie evidence of the debt. Phelps thus articulates in
1788 what later became standard quasi-in-rem doctrine. Massachu-
setts could conclusively determine property rights in the blanket;
but it had no jurisdiction over the debt as such. 4 It should be
noted that at this time no one supposed that an action for debt
absolutely required actual notice to the defendant, and no one
argued that as to the blanket the Massachusetts judgment resulted
in unfairness to the defendant. The original proceeding was con-
sidered in rem, but any subsequent action to recover a deficiency
must be considered in personam. To this limited extent social rela-
tions and property relations were reversible before the close of the
18th century. 5
62. 1 U.S. (1 Dal.) 261 (S. Ct. Pa. 1788).
63. Id. at 264.
64. It is interesting that Mr. Ingersoll, representing the creditor argued that "the
Garnishee has it always in his power to send notice to the Defendant." Id. at 263.
65. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's treatment of Phelps might well have been
influenced by a 1705 Pennsylvania law of attachment patterned on the Custom of London.
See M'Clenachan v. M'Carty, I U.S. (I Dall.) 375 (1788). The statute is construed by Justice
Bushrod Washington on circuit in Fisher v. Consequa, 9 F. Cas. 120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809)
(No. 4,816). Phelps was frequently cited and followed. See, e.g., Kilburn v. Woodworth,
5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809), a case involving a Massachusetts judgment based on the
attachment of a bedstead. Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786), also involved a Massa-
chusetts judgment based on the (dubious) attachment of a handkerchief.
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D. Three Principles
The following cases illustrate the interplay of the three doc-
trinal principles: notice as a requirement of natural justice, strict
statutory construction and the distinction between jurisdictional
and non-jurisdictional errors in following statutory procedures.
Again, there was no argument in any of these cases that the action
was essentially in personam, or that actual notice was required re-
gardless of statutory provisions to the contrary.
Hollingsworth v. Barbour6 was a bill in equity alleging equit-
able title to certain lands upon a parol agreement to convey with
consideration paid. Since the defendant owner died without execut-
ing a conveyance, plaintiff's bill (brought in 1814) sought a con-
veyance from all unknown heirs of the deceased. The chancellor
purported to follow a Kentucky procedure contained in Acts of
1786 and 1802 which provided for service by publication in cases
brought against unknown heirs where plaintiff claims as a "locator"
or under a written instrument. Plaintiff had judgment by default,
and commissioners appointed for the purpose conveyed the land
in 1815. The subsequent action to set aside this conveyance was
brought by persons claiming under prior patents or by adverse
possession.
The chancellor's decree could have been sustained on one of
two grounds: either as a proceeding in rem or as one authorized
by special statute. The federal courts hearing the case rejected the
former on the ground that a decree in chancery for the conveyance
of land had never been considered in rem. Moreover, there had
not been any prior condemnation and seizure of the land. As
for the second ground, the Kentucky statutory scheme was read as
applying only where the plaintiff was a "locator" or claiming
under a written instrument. The federal courts held that the origi-
nal plaintiff was neither, so the bill in equity could not be sustained
under the statutes if the defect was jurisdictional. The Supreme
Court held that the defect was jurisdictional since Kentucky "law
66. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466 (1830).
67. The doctrinal requirement of prior seizure was given constitutional significance
by Pennoyer. Professor Hazard asserts that the requirement of seizure prior to judgment
was "wholly novel" on the ground that Field's opinion seems to require actual seizure
of the land in proceedings in rem. Hazard, supra note 48, at 269. His reading of Pennoyer
on this point may be questioned. The relevant section in Drake's treatise to which he
points is authority for the proposition that actual seizure was not even permitted, and
this section is reproduced without change in the editions published after Pennoyer. If
Pennoyer constitutionalized a rule of actual seizure, as Hazard suggests, the leading treatise
never noticed the fact.
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did not authorize [service by] publication at all ' 68 on the facts of
this case. Consequently, the publication notice actually given could
not be considered implied or constructive notice. In addition, the
1802 statute provided for substitute service where the identity of
the heirs was unknown, but here the original plaintiff brought his
bill without knowing whether or not heirs even existed, and the
record was otherwise silent on the question. The Court held, as a
further jurisdictional defect, that the statute was intended to pro-
vide for actions against unknown heirs, not nonexistent ones. 9
The original action in Voorhees v. Bank of United States °
was brought in 1807 under an 1805 Ohio statute providing for
attachment and notice by publication. Counsel for defendant in
ejectment (claiming under the original defendant) vigorously
argued in the Supreme Court that the original proceeding was not
in rem:
The debt does not grow out of the property attached; there is no
offense committed or duty neglected in regard to it, to form the
basis of the proceeding. The particular property seized is not in
default; no offense has been committed by means of it or in rela-
tion to it; there is no debt constituting a lien on it .... The issue
to be tried... is whether the person defendant is debtor, and the
amount of the debt .... 71
But the Court never responded to the point. It did, however, take
up the argument that the default judgment, with execution on
the property attached, was defective because the record did' not
show that notice by publication, required and permitted by Ohio
law, had ever been made. Justice Baldwin for the Court had no
doubt that a dear distinction could be made between mere errors
of law and jurisdictional defects.72 The defect alleged here-silence
68. 29 U.S. at 476.
69. Id. at 477. See also Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334, 343-44 (1852);
McDaniel v. Sappinton, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 100 (1807) (holding that the statutory remedy
by attachment, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly pursued).
70. 35 US. (10 Pet.) 449 (1836).
71. Id. at 466.67.
72. According to Justice Baldwin, jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors were
Vacuum Bounded.
The line which separates error in judgment from the usurpation of power is
very definite, and is precisely that which denotes the cases where a judgment or
decree is reversible only by an appellate court, or may be declared a nullity col-
laterally . . . . In the one case, it is a record importing absolute verity; in the
other, mere waste paper: there can be no middle character assigned to judicial
proceedings, which are irreversible for error.
Id. at 474-75.
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in the record-was plainly not jurisdictional. Furthermore, the
need for security in land titles was thought to preclude ready dis-
turbance of conveyances. According to the Court, if defendant in
default had moved to set aside the judgment in 1808 he might
have been entitled to the value of the land, but certainly not the
land itself!73
Boswell's Lessee v. Otis74 also arose under Ohio statutory pro-
cedures. The original bill in equity claimed both a debt for
services rendered and a contract to convey; service was by publi-
cation and there was no attachment prior to judgment. Counsel
for plaintiff in ejectment argued that a proceeding to settle title
to land would be in rem, that the chancellor would have juris-
diction, and that a procedure of foreign attachment to settle a
common law debt was "substantially a proceeding in rem" and
would support a default judgment. The Ohio statute authorized
substitute service only in cases of contracts to convey, so that form
could not be used in an action of debt. Thus the original decree
in equity was unauthorized by the 1824 Ohio statute in two re-
spects: A simple action of debt was not covered, and substitute
service in actions for specific performance of contracts to convey
was limited to the land subject of the contract. (The contract to
convey covered "Lot #9" and execution of the judgment was on
"Lot #7".) "[T]he Legislature may, perhaps, subject other lands
to the payment of the judgment on the attachment after the sale
of the lands first attached. But no such proceeding is authorized
by the act under which this procedure was had. '1 75
These few cases illustrate the following points. In the first
half of the 19th century the problem of notice arose entirely in
the context of quasi-in-rem cases. State legislatures consistently
provided for substitute service. The cases were decided largely
on statutory grounds pursuant to the principle of strict construc-
tion. No problem of notice was perceived whenever property was
seized prior to judgment as authorized by statute. To this extent
there is implicit acceptance of the reversibility of property rela-
tions and social relations. But even in proceedings by attachment,
neither statutes nor adjudications permitted extension of the judg-
ment beyond the attached property."0 To this extent the irreversi-
73. Id. at 476.
74. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 (1850).
75. Id. at 349.
76. Even the New York statute at issue in D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165
(1850), provided that judgments in suits against joint debtors, where less than all have
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bility of property relations and social relations was implicitly
asserted. The disputed cases fall into the Live Boundary space be-
tween cases in rem (property relations) and cases in personam
(social relations).
E. State Power
There are a number of reasons why state power vis-a-vis
other states was not perceived as a problem in the area of party
jurisdiction through most of the 19th century. Cases truly in rem
and truly in personam did not raise a power issue for the same
reason they did not raise a notice issue.7 In addition, no doctrinal
distinction was drawn between res judicata cases and full faith and
credit cases. The same principles of natural justice, strict construc-
tion, and jurisdictional error applied in either event.78 Conse-
quently, any serious issue of state power would necessarily arise
in quasi-in-rem cases, for those were the ones involving legisla-
tively authorized extensions of jurisdiction over absent parties.
Issues of state power arose in two circumstances. First, where a
quasi-in-rem judgment plaintiff sought to use his judgment to
recover a deficiency against the defendant found in another state.
Second, where the property attached was an intangible.
A consistent line of cases for at least a century barred the
efforts of quasi-in-rem judgment plaintiffs from suing on their
judgments to obtain a deficiency. The view of the matter taken
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Phelps v. Holker79 in 1788
was elaborated by the United States Supreme Court in 1870 with-
out substantial change:
No general execution can be issued for any balance unpaid after
the attached property is exhausted. No suit can be maintained on
such a judgment in the same court or any other, nor can it be
used as evidence in any other proceeding not affecting the attached
property, nor could the costs in that proceeding be collected of de-
fendant out of any other property than that attached in the suit.80
been actually served or otherwise appeared, may be executed against absent joint debtors
"but . . . not . . . against the body or against the sole property of any person not brought
into court." Id. at 173 (emphasis supplied).
77. See II (B) supra.
78. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 208 (1870) was one of the very important
post-war cases decided before Pennoyer, and was litigated entirely within Tennessee.
79. 1 U.S. (I DalI.) 261 (S. Ct. Pa. 1788).
80. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 318 (1870).
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Given this clear and consistently articulated doctrine, it is un-
likely that suits for deficiency based on quasi-in-rem judgments
could plausibly raise any serious issue of state power.
The matter was much more troublesome, however, where the
property attached was intangible. Such cases brought together
two sorts of uncertainty. First, they were quasi-in-rem cases, which
meant that they had aspects of both the in personam and the in
rem form; they recognized that social relations and property rela-
tions were reversible to a limited degree. Second, where jurisdic-
tion was founded on the attachment of an intangible there was
uncertainty about whether that which was seized was property,
and if "it" was property, where it was located. The issue of state
power in the 19th century arose only in this very limited-but im-
portant-set of cases. The central point is that this issue of state
power turned entirely on a twofold uncertainty regarding the
boundary between social relations and property relations. Since I
have previously discussed the first aspect, quasi-in-rem in general,
I turn now to the second aspect: the problem of intangibles, par-
ticularly that of debt.
According to the Custom of London a debtor could be sued
wherever found; as Justice Holt put it in Andrews v. Clerke,8 ' the
debt follows the debtor. This notion made perfect sense since
debts were commonly regarded as the personal obligation of debt-
ors; the action of debt was solidly in personam. It does not easily
follow from this that a debt may be seized as property securing
jursdiction quasi-in-rem. In the post-Civil War period, however,
there arose a second line of cases holding that debts were the prop-
erty of creditors. 2 These two lines of cases appeared irreconcilable.
81. 90 Eng. Rep. 619 (circa 1700).
82. The cases with clear and extended discussion of the matter are Mason v. Beebee,
44 F. 556 (S.D. Iowa 1890); Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Chumley, 92 Ala. 317, 9 So. 286
(1890); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. Maggard, 6 Colo. App. 85, 59 P. 985 (1895); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Sharritt, 43 Kan. 375, 23 P. 430 (1890); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Smith, 70
Miss. 344, 12 So. 461 (1892). It is important to note that these cases all arise after Pennoyer
and after the State Tax Cases of 1872, 82 U.S. 300 (1872). In Louisville g: Nashville R.R.
v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 23 So. 825 (1897), counsel for the railroad which had paid a
prior garnishment judgment said: "The confusion in the authorities on this subject
results from applying the rules of determining the situs for the purposes of taxation to
questions of situs for purposes of jurisdiction in the courts." 118 Ala. at 480. It is also
interesting that virtually all of these cases involve railroad wage.debts, and the state
courts were, without exception, hostile to foreign attachment judgments which destroy
the wage-debt, particularly in the presence of a local statute exempting wages from
garnishment. The Supreme Court's opinion in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S.
710 (1899), is plainly to the contrary. See text accompanying notes 84 & 85 infra.
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In the State Tax Cases of 1872,3 for example, Justice Field's
opinion for the Court held that debts in the form of bonds were
the property of creditors and these assets followed the creditor.
Where only the obligation was within the boundaries of a state
in the sense that the debtor was there, the state could not tax the
interest on the bonds-the interest taken to be the local debtor's
obligaton. But in the context of jurisdiction the matter remained
confused at least until 1899 when the Court decided Chicago,
R.I.&P. Ry. v. Sturm. Justice McKenna's opinion reconciles the
two lines of cases in the following way:
Of course, the debt is the property of the creditor, and because
it is, the law seeks to subject it, as it does other property, to the
payment of his creditors. If it can be done in any other way than
by process against the jurisdiction of his debtor, that way does not
occur to us.85
This transformation of an obligation of the debtor into an
asset held by the creditor"6 is best illustrated by the classic three
party situation found in Sturm and Harris v. Balk.s7 The three
parties occupied four roles. Plaintiff's debtor, the absent defend-
ant, was also the creditor of the garnishee who was the party actu-
ally served and appearing in court. The thing seized was the
personal obligation of the garnishee conceived of as the property
of the person to whom that obligation was owed. That is, the per-
sonal obligation of the garnishee was treated as an asset of the
absent defendant; hence it was subject to attachment and seizure
like any other asset of an absent defendant. The garnishee be-
came a reified accounts receivable, thus transforming a social re-
lation into a property relation.8
This reversibility was significant for the issue of state power.
83. 82 U.S. 300 (1872).
84. 174 US. 710 (1899). "Any attempt to reconcile the conflicting authorities on the
question of the situs of a debt for the purpose of garnishment would be vain, but analogy,
as well as reason and justice to the creditor, would seem to fix it at the domicile of the
creditor .... " Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 485, 23 So. 825, 827-28
(1897) (emphasis added).
85. 174 U.S. at 716.
86. As a formal matter, this means that a transitive operation has become a reversible
operation. Thus, as a transitive operation: If A (garnishee) owes B (absent defendant),
and B owes C (creditor-plaintiff), then A owes C. As a reversible operation: if a debt is
the same as an asset then as an asset it may satisfy a debt.
87. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
88. The most dramatic historical form of this legal transformation is slavery. See
J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MAsKs OF THE LAW (1976). For a more sophisticated treatment,
see E. GENOvESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 28-31 (1974).
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First, since the exercise of state power was a function of physical
control, it could not be justified unless founded on the presence
of persons or property. In turn, presence depended, in the case
of property, on an agreed definition of the concept. To the ex-
tent there was uncertainty on the matter of definition up to the
end of the 19th century, particularly in the matter of debt, the
bounds of state power could not be resolved. Put another way, the
boundaries of state power depended on an accepted definition of
property. Even well into the 20th century, there is no other seri-
ous issue of state power in the context of party jurisdiction.
The Sturm case, decided just six years before Harris v. Balk,
is particularly interesting because it indicates how narrow the
issue in Harris really was, and because it shows precisely how the
supposed issue of state power was simply a reflection of a question
of property. The facts of Sturm were very similar to those of Harris.
The railroad owed wages to Sturm who lived and worked in Kansas.
A creditor of Sturm attached this wage debt in Iowa. The rail-
road, a citizen of both states, conceded the debt, and the plaintiff
creditor had judgment. Sturm subsequently sued the railroad in
Kansas to collect the wages owed. The railroad pleaded payment,
but Sturm argued that under Kansas case law the situs of a debt
(wages owed) followed the creditor (Sturm) because it was the
creditor's asset.8 9 The putative state power issue was Iowa's ca-
pacity to foreclose Sturm's claim for wages in consequence of its
power over his debtor (railroad). The resolution of this issue
depended upon whether the creditor may treat the railroad's ob-
ligation to Sturm as Sturm's asset. Once it was decided that an obli-
gation to pay money to another could be treated as an asset of the
person to whom it is owed, and that the obligation (in the person
of the obligor) could be seized as (though it were) property, the
issue of state power was no longer pressing.
Having held in Sturm that debts were the property of credi-
tors held by debtors in the form of an obligation, the issue in
Harris v. Balk was all but foreclosed. It would have been difficult
for the Harris Court to have held that the obligation of a debtor
is to be treated as an asset of his creditor only when he is in one
place rather than another. To be sure, the Sturm Court specifically
reserved decision on the question of the temporary presence of the
89. He also argued that the Kansas wage exemption should have applied in the Iowa
proceedings.
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debtor-garnishee within the jurisdiction ° and this lends some
credence to the view that the problem of state power was viewed
as separable from the conceptual definition of property. But there
is a more plausible reason for reserving the question of temporary
presence. According to the 1891 edition of Drake on Attachment,
the Custom of London and "the uniform tenor of the [American]
adjudications is that whether the defendant reside or not in the
State in which the attachment is obtained, a non-resident cannot
be subjected to garnishment there . . . ."9 The question had to
be left open because almost two centuries of doctrine had de-
veloped around the problem of the absconding debtor, not the
miraculously appearing garnishee. Consequently, if the Court in
Harris had been concerned with state power, there was this solid
body of doctrine dating back to the Custom of London which
would have allowed it to deny jurisdiction on the facts of the case
without disturbing any of its prior decisions in this respect. But
the issue was property, not state power.
Minor's 1901 treatise on conflicts,92 upon which the Harris
Court relied, enumerates six alternative theories for resolving the
basic attachment situation. One is not an alternative at all,93 and
the remaining five are simple variations on a smaller set of basic
choices: the debt follows the creditor (as in the State Tax Cases
of 1872), or the debt follows the debtor (as in Sturm). A third
possible rule limits the situs of the debt to the domicile of the
debtor. The first choice had already been rejected by the Court
in Sturm and was inconsistent with a century of American practice
elaborating the Custom of London. The third choice was based
on the mere fiction that debts were payable out of the debtor's
funds which were presumptively located at his domicile, and in
any event provided no assurance that absent defendants would
be notified of a pending lawsuit. Minor himself took the view that
the second alternative represented the "true" theory,94 and the
90. 174 US. at 716.
91. C. DRAKE, TsE LAWv OF SuITs By ATrACHMENT § 474 (7th ed. 1891).
92. R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1901).
93. The place where the debt was payable fixed its situs only when the garnishee
was a non-resident; an exception to the general rule rather than an alternative theory.
94. Minor believed that this theory preserved what he called the "dual nature of
the debt, which, while placing the creditor's right to sue (or chose in action) with the
creditor, places the debtor's obligation to pay and the creditor's ability to exact payment
with the debtor." R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAws 287 (1901). The duality in this formula-
tion is rather hard to find. Under his "true" theory debts would be treated no differently
from horses or blankets.
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Harris Court concurred without dwelling on the serious concep-
tual dispute that lay behind it.
F. Transformation
By the mid-20th century these issues of party jurisdiction are
discussed wholly in terms of the twin notions of state power and
fairness to litigants. I have tried to argue that the issue in the
earlier period was different; it is more accurately characterized
as one of private law rather than public law. More broadly, I have
argued that the troublesome cases fell between clearly understood
notions: in that Live Boundary space between social relations and
property relations; between jurisdiction in personam and juris-
diction in rem. This Live Boundary space, doctrinally labelled
quasi-in-rem, was functionally similar to the doctrine of Ex parte
Young. That is, the quasi-in-rem concept split the question of per-
sonal obligation from the question of rights in the attached prop-
erty, the same way Young split the questions of attribution and
vindication.
The analysis I have suggested raises two larger problems the
contours of which I will only suggest. First, the evidence indicates
that by the end of the 19th century just about any type of lawsuit
could be treated as a proceeding "essentially" in rem. Given this
movement, why was it so important to retain a correlative in
personam "essence" found in the doctrine that a judgment quasi-
in-rem was in no way personally binding on the absent party? In
other words, why was the reversibility of social relations and prop-
erty relations only partial? I suggest, though there are surely large
gaps in the evidence, that it was partial because of a contradiction
between ends. On the one hand, the common law of property
had been a law of feudal relations from which a bourgeois law of
social relations was being derived. This effort had been in progress
for at least two centuries; jurisdictional rules were certainly no
more than a small corner of the field. On the other hand, the
need to protect credit tended to resist this trend in certain con-
texts. Thus, if the creditor-debtor relationship was one of obliga-
tion, jurisdiction over the body of the latter would be necessary,
but this would not provide maximum protection for creditors.05
95. The need to protect the security of credit was frequently inconsistent with the
need to protect the security of land titles. Proceeding by foreign attachment, jurisdiction
quasi-in-rem, served the former but undercut the latter where the property attached and
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Treating this relationship as one of property, however, looked,
like feudalism.2 6 Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction mediated this contra-
diction for a time, but it was a crucial time.
Second, the form of this mediation appears to have changed
in the 20th century. To be sure, the cases, from International
Shoe97 on, chew over the 19th century doctrinal complex, but the
niceties of private law in general, and the concept of property
in particular, no longer appear critical in the major cases. While
there is reason to believe this transformation was part of that
larger transformation which followed the disintegration of classical
conceptualism,"' a somewhat different point can be made. Justice
Jackson glumly observed that under 19th century doctrine notice
was not required when the proceeding was in rem, and the pro-
ceeding was in rem whenever notice was not required.9 9 There is
some truth in this, but a similar observation may be made of mini-
mum contact doctrine: it is unfair to subject defendants to a
jurisdiction with which their contacts are less than minimum;
minimum contacts are satisfied when it is not unfair to subject
defendants to suit in a particular jurisdiction. However, the cir-
cularity in either 19th or 20th century doctrine misses the point.
I have tried to show that in 19th century doctrine the critical
cases involved social relations which were reified in order to
found jurisdiction quasi-in-rem: a relation of debt became an
asset. Under post-1940 doctrine the movement was reversed: be-
executed on was land. See the discussion of Voorhees, text accompanying notes 70-73 supra,
for a decision preferring the security of land titles over that of creditors. Drake ties the
American expansion of the writ of attachment to a need to protect credit which became
particularly serious in America as a consequence of federalism, interstate mobility, the
expansion of credit and the abolition of debtors prison. C. DRAxca, THE LAw OF SUITS BY
ATTACHMENT § 3 (5th ed. 1878).
96. Admiralty aside, in rem was the procedural equivalent of land law, and land
law remained essentially feudal well into the 20th century. But the action for debt was
the procedural equivalent of the bill of exchange, and the latter was long associated with
the liberal benefits of moveable property, the rise of the mercantile class and, in Monte-
squieu, with inherent limits on arbitrary governance. See A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PAssIONs
AND THE INTEREsTs 69-81 (1977). However, the point in the text should not be taken too
broadly. I intend only to suggest the possibility of a contradiction in relevant ideology.
The contradiction is analogous to that noted by Genovese in his treatment of 19th cen-
tury American slaveholders: on the one hand, a view of economic life structured according
to the "possessive individualism" of contractarian liberalism. On the other hand, a view
of social life structured according to a patriarchial, organic system of essential statuses.
E. GENOVEsE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE, Part II, ch. 1 (1969). Blackstone's treat-
ment of the matter is discussed in Kennedy, supra note 11, at Part IV C.
97. International Shod Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
98. See D. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought 1850-1940 ch. 5
(unpublished 1976).
99. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
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fore an asset could form the basis of jurisdiction there had to be
some contact between its owner and some person(s) within the
jurisdiction. 100 Property relations are transformed back into social
relations when subjected to minimum contacts analysis.10 1 Mediat-
ing this transformation is the judicial method of assessment known
as balancing.
100. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the most recent word on the subject,
was a stockholder's derivative action against a Delaware corporation and a number of
non-resident officers and directors. Plaintiff's bill in equity essentially alleged mismanage-
ment resulting in substantial corporate losses. Jurisdiction was secured by sequestering
stock held by the non-resident defendants which, by Delaware law, were deemed present
in the state without regard to the actual location of the certificates. The Court seized
the occasion to hold that in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction should be subjected to
the minimum contacts standards applicable to in personam actions. Shaffer thus rounds
out the 20th century reversal of the 19th century sequence: where the 19th century
gradually allowed most in personam suits to be brought as in rem actions through the
mediation of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, the 20th century has gradually reversed this process
by progressively treating property relations as social relations. Shaffer holds that for jurisdic-
tion to attach a set of social relations must be established between the parties, the claim,
and the place.
101. Compare Marx, commenting on the inability of economists to recognize exchange-
value as a social relation because of the "illusions of the Monetary System": "This emerges
clearly in their confession of naive astonishment when the phenomenon that they have
just ponderously described as a thing reappears as a social relation and, a moment later,
having been defined as a social relation, teases them once more as a thing." K. MAnE,
A CONTIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 35 (Dobb trans. 1970). See
Hazard, note 48 & accompanying text supra.
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III. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE:
A LIVE BOUNDARY FOR ERIE
A. Classifying: Substance and Procedure
My point of departure for this discussion of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins'0 2 is the recently developed conception of the structure
of American legal thought in the postCivil War period. The major
characteristic of this "classical" period is its division of basic legal
notions into "powers absolute within their spheres."'1 3 This con-
ception appears to have permeated all, or most, areas of law, but
I shall be concerned here only with the dualistic relation between
the states and the federal government.
In this "classical" conception, the states and the federal gov-
ernment were separate sovereigns each enjoying autonomy within
its appropriate sphere of power. The language in Tarble's Case
is representative:
There are within the territorial limits of each State two govern-
ments, restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of
each other, and supreme within their restrictive spheres. Each has
its separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and each has
its own tribunals for their enforcement. Neither government can
intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference
therein by its judicial officers with the action of the other.104
Erie's solution to the misconception, or "unconstitutional" theory,
of Swift v. Tyson'05 was to simply apply this classical notion of
tightly bounded spheres of autonomous power to the context of
diversity jurisdiction.
The Erie principle has been universally accepted and praised,
but nearly all of its progeny have been seriously criticized; no sub-
sequent case seems to be a simple particularization of the general
principle. Instead, the history of the Erie doctrine is constituted
by a series of "tests" for determining the distribution of particular
issues into the separate spheres of state and federal power. But,
like Erie itself, each test has been merely a set of dualistic notions
which spawned analytic binds at lower levels of generality. Thus
102. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
103. D. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought 1850-1940 ch. 2
(unpublished 1976).
104. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1871).
105. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 06 the Court distinguished between
rules which affected the outcome of litigation and those which did
not; Henry Hart attempted to salvage this mysterious clarification
of Erie's dualism by distinguishing rules affecting primary private
activity from rules relevant to litigation only; 07 more recent at-
tempts distinguish rules reflecting significant state policies from
those which do not. 08 The latter effort commends itself by virtue
of the fact that it puts judges and scholars to a great deal more
effort and research than the simple Sibbach v. Wilson'O test of
whether the rule in question "really" regulates procedure. Under
Sibbach, all a judge could do after stating the test was assert that
the rule in question did or did not really regulate procedure, and
perhaps try to give a reason or two. Needless to say, there would
always be equally good reasons for the opposite conclusion. The
inquiry into policies, however, requires a good deal more research
and purports to result in richer opinions. But, as recent scholar-
ship so painfully indicates," 0 research into policies frequently
turns up very little useful information; in the end policies seem
invented to suit the occasion.
There is, however, another doctrinal history of the post-Erie
period. This alternative history is constituted by a series of at-
tempts to solve the problem of dualism by the insertion of a
middle category between "powers absolute within their spheres."
The simplest of these attempts suggested the possibility of quasi-
procedural rules."' The suggestion never caught on. Undoubtedly
no one believed that calling a rule quasi-procedural was much of
a solution since the ultimate distribution was necessarily dualistic:
either the states or the federal government would have law mak-
ing power. Quasi-procedural rules, if they existed, would have to
be placed in one sphere or the other so it hardly mattered what
the rules were called.
Hanna v. Plumer"2 is a more sophisticated attempt to define
a middle category. Hanna would create a middle category com-
posed of rules which are rationally capable of being characterized
106. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
107. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 23.
108. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1974).
109. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
110. Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. Rav.
741 (1974).
111. HART &WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 713.
112. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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as either substance or procedure. The case holds that where a rule
may rationally be placed in either category, a rule authorized by
Congress may control without doing violence to either Erie or
the Constitution. Justice Harlan's objection to this resolution of
Erie's conceptual dualism expresses his preference for a dualistic
particularizing principle: he argues for the distinction between
rules regulating primary private activity and those which refer to
litigation. But there is more to his dissent than a preference for
dualism; his objection is also grounded on the view that the Court's
"arguably procedural, ergo Constitutional" test constituted a
federalist tour de force. Given this objection, Harlan might have
nevertheless abandoned Erie's dualism by suggesting an "arguably
substantive, ergo unconstitutional" test. This hypothetical alterna-
tive test would have had the advantage of creating a middle cate-
gory while holding federalist expansion in check. However, in
the context of Hanna it would have had the disadvantage of in-
validating a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Harlan's dilemma
was that he could not simultaneously defer both to the states and
to the Congress unless he adhered to the "classical" dualism of
separate powers absolute within their spheres.
However, a slightly more complicated version of the "argu-
ably procedural" test may be attached to the distinction, drawn
by the Hanna Court, between cases falling under the Rules of
Decision Act (the "true" Erie cases) and those cases to be decided
under the Rules Enabling Act. This middle category would func-
tion in the following way: In cases under the Rules of Decision
Act, a rule which is arguably substantive should generate the ap-
plication of state law. In cases under the Rules Enabling Act, a
rule which is arguably procedural should generate the application
of federal law. This somewhat more complicated middle category
-arguably procedural/arguably substantive-satisfies the claim
that Acts of Congress (or rules made pursuant to the Rules En-
abling Act) should have more power to displace state law than
federal court made rules" 3-the separation of powers issue within
the problem of federalism. It also satisfies the claim that the
Rules of Decision Act expressed a decided preference for state
law even where there was potential federal power over the
matter'14-cases like Erie itself.
113. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REv.
1682 (1974).
114. Ely, supra note 108, at 704-06.
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The middle category constructed in this way has a further
characteristic of significance for the separation of powers issue
within the Erie problem of federalism. In the "classical" concep-
tion of powers absolute within their spheres, a federal court "moni-
tored" the distribution of competence but perceived itself as
otherwise neutral. The Erie decision is totally consistent with
this view. The contemporary version of the classical concep-
tion is the argument that the importance of the distinction be-
tween cases under the Rules of Decision Act (true Erie cases)
and the Rules Enabling Act lies in the superior authority of Con-
gress (over the federal courts) to displace otherwise applicable
state rules."5 The middle category suggested here, however, places
both Congress and the federal courts in mediating positions with
respect to these issues of federalism. That is, congressional action
generates an "arguably procedural" orientation, but it remains
for the courts to determine whether the matter is arguable or not.
Reciprocally, in the absence of congressional action, under the
Rules of Decision Act, the "arguably substantive, ergo state law"
orientation, applies. In this situation deference is paid to the con-
gressional preference expressed in the Rules of Decision Act, and
deference is paid to the states by the arguably substantive test, but
it remains for the federal courts to determine whether the matter
is arguable.
B. Splitting: Court and Congress
Consequently, it is possible to understand substance and pro-
cedure as separated by a Live Boundary. Swift was a disaster be-
cause it neither created a clear conceptual distinction which would
satisfy federalist theory, nor pointed toward a coherent middle posi-
tion. As I have tried to show in previous sections, a coherent Live
Boundary in the context of personal jurisdiction was achieved
by splitting the question of personal obligation from the question
of rights in the attached property; in the context of actions against
the states, by splitting the question of attribution from the ques-
tion of vindication. Swift failed to relate the separation of powers
115. This view is common in current research. There are two dominant strands to
the argument: (1) the framers intentions; (2) the fact of state representation in the Con-
gress. Both are reflected in two minor strands: (1) the intention of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment; (2) the continuing life of the tenth amendment through which
the federal courts protect the states from the stupidity of their representatives in the
Congress. My dissent from these arguments is recorded in note 16 supra.
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issue to the federalism issue. Whether a rule is arguably pro-
cedural/substantive might be a question for the court, but the
disposition of the matter in the event of arguability-the federal-
ism issue-may be pretermitted by Congress.
From this perspective Erie was as much a failure as Swift.
What the latter attempted to achieve by tour de force the former
achieved by "classical" conceptualism. The two cases are con-
sistent in that both deny the possibility of a Live Boundary be-
tween legal issues to which state law applies and those to which
federal law applies.
It is not true, therefore, that Erie overruled both Swift and a
conception of law. This view replaces a federalist tour de force
(Swift) with a positivist tour de force (Erie). The "general law"
of Swift never specified its legitimizing authority. The rule of
decision Swift applied was, at best, grounded in custom; at worst,
it was grounded in the general authority of judges to adjudicate
particular cases. Positivist ideology rejects the former outright.
As to the latter, it insists that judges point to some authority in-
dependent of the authority to be exercised in the particular case.
But we certainly know now-even if they didn't know then-that
whatever authority exists independent of that to be exercised in
the particular case falls far short of an imperative. In litigated
cases judges confront conflicting rules, or at least conflicts over
the applicability or interpretation of rules. In these cases the voice
of the sovereign babbles in its articulations. Even closer to the
point are those cases in which the sovereign-in the guise of judges
in prior cases within the jurisdiction-has not spoken at all. Positiv-
ism has always been at a loss to account honestly for these cases. A
judge who decides such a case after exploring the articulated wis-
dom of other sovereigns is not easily distinguished from Justice
Story in Swift. The dispute at this juncture must shift ground: the
distinction needs to be one of attitude. The judge feels bound by
prior articulations within sovereignty; he is only advised by ex-
ternal authority. Perhaps there is something to this difference of
mood, but it is a far cry from the initial positivist claim that Erie
overruled a way of looking at law. At best the case was present at
the inauguration of an era of judicial deference in general, and
federal judicial deference in particular.
This mood of deference put Erie at odds with itself. On the
one hand, the conceptual distinction between substance and pro-
cedure was articulated as the key to the deployment of power be-
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tween sovereigns. This was the federalism issue. On the other
hand, the mood implied federal judicial deference to Congress, and
on this separation of powers issue Erie was silent. Nevertheless,
the mood opened up the possibility of a middle position, a possi-
bility which remained unarticulated until Hanna. When this
possibility is realized, as in the arguably procedural/arguably
substantive thesis I have suggested, the mood of deference becomes
concretized as legal doctrine.1 16
C. Deferring: Legitimacy and Responsibility
The mood of deference simply reflects the fundamental issues
of (judicial) legitimacy and (corporate) responsibility within a
theory of representation,17 this time in the context of the diversity
jurisdiction. This issue has been traditionally posed as: Was the
diversity jurisdiction meant to provide a neutral forum only, or
did it leave open the possibility of being a source of non-discrimi-
natory (better) rules of decision? The latter view is exemplified
by Swift, the former view by Erie-or at least modern Erie scholar-
ship. But Swift not only rejected a diversity jurisdiction limited
to neutrality; it also perceived the question as simply one of fed-
eralism. The modern view is necessarily ambivalent about the
true scope of the jurisdiction, but resolves the question as a func-
tion of the separation of powers: the scope of the diversity clause
is for Congress to determine.
This modern view is based on an implicit constitutional
"theory" which may be briefly stated in two alternative formula-
tions: (1) The constitutional distribution of powers within the
federal government is easier to understand/manage than the dis-
tribution of powers between the federal and state governments.
Issues of (judicial) legitimacy are easier than issues of (corporate)
responsibility; (2) There is no viable theory limiting (federal)
116. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROn13LMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 545-46 (tent. ed. 1958):
A school of legal writers occupied themselves during the twenties and thirties
happily and sometimes usefully debunking what are called the "myths" of judicial
rationality and objectivity. See, e.g., FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
During the forties and fifties there has grown up, and been fostered sometimes
by the same writers, a myth of legislative omni-competence reaching on occasion
heights of fantasy beyond any which the earlier myths ever attained. It can safely
be predicted that this latter-day myth is destined for an even more drastic de.
bunking in the sixties.
117. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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legislative power, but there is a viable theory limiting (federal)
judicial power. The problem of corporate responsibility remains
unsolved. Both versions make the same claim; the first is in a more
legal form than the second, political, version. The critical point is
that this modern view presupposes, and is presupposed by, the
mood of deference. Within this mood all constitutional questions
may be resolved-though of course some will be more difficult than
others.
The mood of deference is the post-positivist universal media-
tor in constitutional theory. Issues of federalism are resolved by
reference to the separation of powers, and these issues are in turn
resolved through the mood of deference. This universal mediation
would not be possible without the firmly accepted notion that
politics and law must be distinct orders of experience. The great
irony of judicial review is that it begins as a dubious usurpation
of politics by law, but ultimately leaves plenty of room for the
resolution of political issues within law through the mood of
deference.
D. Balancing: Law and Politics
The mood of deference requires one further component in
order to fulfill its current role as universal mediator. The mood
is brought to the surface by that famous confrontation of law and
politics in 1937. The court-packing plan"1 8 was the supreme vin-
dication of that schoolish naivete which is awed by the beauty of
checks and balances at work. In this confrontation law was checked
by politics and emerged deferential. But for anyone who believed
in Marbury v. Madison and the rule of law, the confrontation was
a disaster. The theory of the political check is fine, but the rule of
law requires that it rarely occur lest the distinction between law
and politics disintegrate. 19 The way to obviate the necessity of a
118. See Leuchtenberg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan,
1966 Sup. CT. Riv. 847.
119. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 363:
Could it be argued that it is politically healthy that Professor Ratner's position
has never been authoritatively accepted and that the limits of Congressional power
have never been completely clarified? Does the existence of a Congressional power
of unspecified scope help the maintenance of a desirable tension between Court
and Congress? In some circumstances, may not attempts to restrict jurisdiction be
an appropriate and important way for the political branches to register disagree-
ment with the Court and to channel and focus such contrary opinions in a way
that will come to the Court's attention? And it is not enormously significant in
1979]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
real political check is to insert that check within the rule of law
itself: 20 thus the powers of the political branches of government
may be balanced like any other set of "interests" would be. In
this way balancing is inserted within the mood of deference as its
method and meaning.
121
Concluding Thought
Middle positions are ubiquitous in modern legal discourse,
and there is something important to be said about that. But equally
important is the attitude that regards them as inevitable, almost
natural phenomena: the best poor humanity can hope for after
the fall. The suggestion that a choice between alternatives is pos-
sible or desirable is regarded as just the sort of ideological abso-
lutism liberal democracy was intended to forestall. Choosing
between alternatives is impossible without a metaphysics of truth
or knowledge of the good, and liberal democracy denies all forms
of absolutism. Just as Madison sought to steer a middle course be-
tween anarchy and monarchy, modern legal discourse is dedicated
to avoiding choice at all levels of doctrinal elaboration. Between
every pair of alternatives modern legal thought inserts a method
in the form of a principle (equitable or otherwise), or a doctrine
like "implication," or a mode of discretion, or a maxim of inter-
this regard that, ever since McCardle, such "attempts" have, in the main, been
just that, that Congress has not significantly cut back the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion in a "vindictive" manner despite the enormous unpopularity from time to
time of some of its rulings?
120. See id. at 364:
[C]ould it not be argued that, politically and psychologically, the legitimacy of
judicial review is enormously buttressed by the continuing existence of Congres-
sional power to curtail jurisdiction? That the continuing existence of this power,
rather than being a threat to judicial independence, is one of its important
(though subtle) bulwarks?
Similarly, discretion, once considered to be the antithesis of law by scholars like Henry
Hart, may come to be viewed as part of its essential quality. I discuss this in Disorienting
Deviance and the Rule of Law (unpublished 1978).
121. There are three histories of balancing which have yet to be tied together: the
doctrinal history from the early 20th century to the present; the philosophy of the good
dating from Aristotle; the liberal theory from 17th century religious thought which takes
form as a central political concept in the 18th century. For an example of the last, see
J. Isr_., THm CENTURY oF REvOLUTIONs: 1603-1714, at 252-53 (1961) :
Fear of the vulgar, of the emotional, of anything extreme, was deeply rooted in
the social anxieties of Restoration England. Enthusiasm was associated with
lower class revolution: the propertied classes had learned the dangers of carrying
things to extremes, and were learning the virtues of compromise. Halifax saw
God Almighty as a trimmer too, "divided between his two great attributes, his
mercy and his justice."
On the situating of the judiciary in the middle for balance see id. at 297-99.
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pretation, or a burden of proof. But the structure of thought is
always the same, and its theoretical basis is very simple. The truth
may not be knowable in general, but it may be known in particu-
lar. To be sure, this statement collapses with its utterance, but
with a final desperate effort it enters that wider discourse of
method in science that currently contains the hottest war of its
history. The question is: How can there be an objective method
if there can be no objective knowledge of substance? Modern
legal thought enters on the fringes of this theatre because that is
its only hope of resolving the contradiction that threatens to de-
stroy what is left of the rule of law. This contradiction has two
aspects. First, how can the method used to decide particulars be
objectively valid while substantive truth is shrouded in mystery?
Second, if the middle way is inevitable, necessary, unavoidable, it
becomes the true way by virtue of its inevitability. But if it is the
true way, how has liberal democratic theory avoided its own
devilish spectre? If the middle way is the truth, it is not the middle
way but simply a form of absolutism.
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